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Abstract
This thesis examines the possibilities for women’s empowerment through
microfinance. It utilizes the results of a survey conducted in 2009 with clients of the
microfinance organization FINCA Honduras. The analysis of these survey results yields
important conclusions on FINCA Honduras’ ability to empower Honduran women
economically, psychologically, and socio-culturally. The original hypothesis of this study
stated that FINCA Honduras’ financial services would help the female client to improve
her standard of living, her psychological well-being, and her gender relationships in the
home. FINCA Honduras has partially succeeded in empowering its female clients in
these ways, but currently lacks the specific tools and/or motivations to fully empower
women through its services. The findings presented by this thesis offer evidence against
microfinance’s ability to automatically empower the female client, and consequently
challenge its growing reputation as a panacea for world poverty and gender inequality.
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INTRODUCTION
If you give a man a fish, you feed him for a day.
If you teach a man to fish, you feed him for the rest of his life.
Anonymous
In an age of globalization and increasing global disparity between rich and poor,
the world has seen the rise of a new and celebrated poverty-fighting strategy in past
decades: microfinance. Microfinance organizations, by definition, provide financial
services to poor entrepreneurs, most commonly small loans to help poor individuals start
or grow small businesses. Microfinance also includes the provision of other services such
as savings opportunities and micro-insurance to the poor. Since its beginnings in the
1970s, microfinance has spread exponentially worldwide with the backing of countless
governments and influential international organizations such as the United Nations and
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It has been endorsed and applied in developing
countries from Bangladesh to Bolivia as a hopeful cure for economic inequality. This
poverty-fighting strategy has also specifically been praised for its sustainability—instead
of functioning as a charity, it aims to provide poor individuals with the tools to pull
themselves out of poverty and sustain their financial success. The great faith that the
world has placed in microfinance in recent years has made it seem the panacea for world
poverty. Its impact on the alleviation of poverty on a grand scale has yet to be assessed,
but important changes have occurred at the individual level for microfinance clients as
they improve their financial stability and standard of living through small enterprise.
Microfinance has become popular not only for its alleged ability to combat
poverty but for its potential to empower the microfinance client, especially those clients
who are women. In many of the developing countries where microfinance has become

!

1

prevalent, gender inequalities play a powerful role in societal structure and contribute
greatly to the nation’s poverty and underdevelopment. The possibility of empowering
women and granting them greater economic, psychological, and social agency through a
simple loan therefore makes microfinance a compelling initiative at the micro and the
macro level. Empowering an individual woman in a third world nation not only grants
her greater independence and control over her life, but may also contribute to the wellbeing of her family and in part to the alleviation of poverty in her country. It is on this
platform of the simultaneous alleviation of poverty and empowerment of women that
many microfinance organizations have promoted their work and gained financial support.
But much research still remains to be done on microfinance’s individual and collective
impact among the poor. We must continue to investigate the exact ways in which
microfinance works as a tool to reverse poverty and to empower the individual before we
can make claims on its worldwide success.
This thesis will address the specific impact of the non-profit microfinance
organization FINCA Honduras on its female clients, in terms of economic, psychological,
and socio-cultural changes in their lives. When I began my research on this topic, I was
interested in how exactly empowerment could be achieved for women through the simple
provision of microloans and other financial services. I started with a high level of
optimism on microfinance’s ability to impact the poor female client, but also wanted to
investigate firsthand the true feasibility of empowerment for female clients of
microfinance institutions. I was interested in learning about the individual struggles and
advances of women as recipients of microloans and their stories of success or failure. I
was granted this opportunity through an internship from June to August of 2009 with
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FINCA Honduras. As my primary task for this internship, I was given a standardized
survey to administer with clients on their standard of living, confidence, and satisfaction
with the organization, among other indicators. This survey was part of a series of surveys
created by FINCA International to measure the organization’s impact on its clients. I will
use the data collected from this survey to present my own findings on one Honduran
microfinance organization and its ability to empower the women it serves.
This thesis will be organized by the following chapters. In my first chapter, I will
discuss the history and development of microfinance as a poverty-fighting strategy since
its beginnings in the 1970s, touching on microfinance’s global spread, the variety of
lending strategies and financial models that have evolved among microfinance
institutions over the years, and the specific Latin American model of microfinance. In
Chapter Two, I will address the specific meaning of female “empowerment” in its three
facets—economic, psychological, and socio-cultural—and its feasibility through
microfinance as previously investigated worldwide, highlighting the current debates
among microfinance scholars on empowerment possibilities for women. Chapter Three
will provide an economic, political, and social background of the country of Honduras,
discussing the specific struggles that have led Honduras to its underdeveloped status
today. In my fourth chapter I will outline the essential characteristics of FINCA Honduras
as a microfinance organization, and I will present the methodology that I used in my
administration of the FINCA survey with clients in Honduras in June and July 2009,
providing specifics on my internship with the organization and on the survey’s format.
Chapter Five will present a detailed and statistical analysis of my collected data on the
female clients of FINCA Honduras and the organization’s economic, psychological, and
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socio-cultural impact on their lives. Finally, in my seventh and last chapter I will discuss
my conclusions on FINCA’s success in empowering its female clients and its general
success as a microfinance organization. I will offer suggestions for the betterment of
FINCA’s services and, based on the aggregation of my research in this thesis, I will
present my current opinions on microfinance as a tool for poverty alleviation and
empowerment.
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MICROFINANCE

Microfinance’s Beginnings: Muhammad Yunus and The Grameen Bank
The idea of granting small loans to the poor had its most famous beginnings in
1974 with a Bangladeshi economist by the name of Muhammad Yunus. Yunus was the
head of the economics department at Bangladesh’s Chittagong University, and when a
devastating famine struck his country in 1974, he began to feel frustrated with the
abstract economic theories that he taught to his students daily.1 He wanted to find a
practical solution to starvation and poverty, one that did not rely on academic notions of
“trickle-down” effects but that came from the people themselves. Yunus began to study
economics from what he called a “worm’s eye view”: in the city streets, with “the people
as his professors”.2 It was through this research on poverty and its sources that he arrived
at the notion that the fair provision of credit to poor entrepreneurs could make every
difference in their survival. In 1976, Yunus granted the first microloan in Bangladesh—
only twenty-seven dollars—to forty-two bamboo stool weavers in the village of Jobra.3
From the time of this first microloan to the Grameen Bank’s official certification
as a financial institution in 1983, Yunus and his coworkers created a widely replicated
micro-lending model that focused on the provision of group loans to mostly female
clients in the poorest sector of society. According to Yunus, client group membership
ensured higher repayment of loans and provided necessary mutual support and
opportunities to learn collectively. He asserted that “subtle and at times not-so-subtle peer
pressure” and “a sense of intergroup and intragroup competition” were mechanisms that
would motivate each client to handle her credit in a timely and responsible way.4 The
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failure of one individual had the potential to affect the eligibility of the entire group for
its next loan, while a group’s collective success would allow all of its members to
increase their subsequent loan sizes. He also emphasized that group members could help
each other in the repayment of their loans if a certain individual met economic
difficulties.5 The group would learn together how to manage their businesses more
effectively, sharing strategies and encouragement. Thus the solidarity group became the
smart model for lending money to vulnerable clients who had no previous credit
experience. Just as Yunus had a specific reason for the use of groups, he saw the
extension of microloans to women as a strategic necessity.
In Bangladesh and in locations worldwide where microfinance has flourished
since the start of the Grameen Bank, the focus on women has proved essential in making
a strong impact on financial gender equality and on the alleviation of poverty at the
individual and familial level. When Muhammad Yunus first advocated for women as the
primary clients of his microfinance program, he pointed out that the formal banking
system had clearly been “created for men”—women were not authorized to take out a
loan from a bank without the presence of a man, and were therefore kept from financial
independence or self-advancement by the local system.6 By granting women the right to
credit, Yunus saw that he could alleviate this gender inequality while also fighting
poverty in the most widespread and effective way. He explains in Banker to the Poor,
“Not only do women constitute the majority of the poor, the underemployed, and the
economically and socially disadvantaged, but they more readily and successfully improve
the welfare of both children and men. Studies comparing how male borrowers use their
loans versus female borrowers consistently show this to be the case”.7 It was for these
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reasons that Yunus’ microfinance, with its inherent goal of poverty alleviation, became
clearly focused on women—as the poorest population and the most selfless providers for
their families, women were the perfect clients for microloans. With their success, new
generations and entire communities could potentially be guaranteed a higher standard of
living and a greater chance for the future.
Yunus also had a tactical reason for reaching clients at the absolute lowest
poverty level—not only because they deserved the right to credit most, but because they
proved unprecedentedly faithful in their repayment of loans and responsibility with their
credit. Before the Grameen Bank, all other formal banking institutions had viewed the
poor as the riskiest clients and therefore unfit for financial services. But Muhammad
Yunus declared that the poor would pay back their loans unlike any other clients, because
they would value the money more and would monitor its use with great care. A small
Grameen loan would be the “one and only chance” for a poor individual to escape
destitution.8 According to these early microfinance theories, clients from the poorest
sectors of society appreciate highly the trust of a microfinance organization and will do
whatever they can to hold on to such an opportunity for success. They are so faithful that
even standard procedures such as collateral are unnecessary—as Yunus highlights, those
clients who managed their loans without collateral in fact showed a higher repayment rate
than those who were guaranteed by personal assets.9 With its revolutionary policies, the
Grameen Bank proved to the world that the poor not only deserved but could also
manage credit as well as any other financial clients.
The original micro-lending model pioneered by the Grameen Bank was
characterized by low-pressure loan conditions and a cooperative relationship between
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organization and client that allowed for flexibility of services. The formula for a Grameen
loans is as follows: Loans last one year, a long loan term compared to most institutions.
Repayment installments are paid weekly in very small amounts, at two percent of the
loan amount per week. Finally, the interest rate is two currency units per week for every
thousand currency units of the loan, which amounts to twenty percent interest over the
entire year.10 These loan conditions allow vulnerable clients to manage their loans easily
and without the stress of large repayments at any time, and thus are ideal for
microfinance that reaches the most poor. In the Grameen model, solidarity groups are
also required to accumulate small incremental savings collectively. Each member
deposits five percent of her loan in a group fund over time. If a certain member
encounters a difficult financial situation, she can take out a loan interest-free from this
group fund upon the agreement of her group.11 Such measures allow clients to learn the
value of saving together and to create a cushion for themselves in the event of a crisis.
Finally, Grameen clients are given the flexibility to modify their specific loan conditions
depending on their performance and on environmental circumstances. Long-term clients
who prove themselves as dependable borrowers can be granted new, larger loans for
purposes outside of business, such as home construction.12 If a client lives through an
economic crisis or a natural disaster, on the other hand, her old loan is given an extra long
term that can be paid in smaller increments, but her loan will not be wiped out
altogether.13 With this combination of stress-free and flexible strategies, the Grameen
Bank model of microfinance became the widely praised and replicated way to
successfully provide credit to the poor.
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Muhammad Yunus would soon see his revolutionary idea taking hold around the
world. Since 1976, microfinance institutions and strategies have grown substantially and
have adapted to the specific environments of the countries in which they work. Today, a
variety of debates have emerged concerning the most effective microfinance models and
the specific goals and purposes that microfinance organizations should focus on. We will
now examine the spread and development of microfinance over time, and the essential
differences that exist today among its leading institutions.

Microfinance’s Global Spread
In the mid-1970s, as Muhammad Yunus was first forming the Grameen Bank in
Bangladesh, similar ideas for micro-lending and assisting poor entrepreneurs were
forming in Latin America. In Brazil in 1972, Projeto Uno began providing working
capital loans to the owners of small businesses. Low interest rate and other easy loan
conditions to help the poorest clients were not the focus of Projeto Uno, but this
organization was the first to provide loans through a system of loan officers who worked
closely and personally with clients, a model which prevails today in many microfinance
institutions.14 ACCION International, a poverty-fighting volunteer organization that
started in Caracas, Venezuela in 1961, began issuing microloans to clients in 1973. In the
next decade, ACCION would help to establish microfinance institutions in over fourteen
countries throughout Latin America.15 One of these organizations was the worldrecognized BancoSol of Bolivia, the first non-governmental microfinance institution to
become a formal regulated bank, which originated in response to an extreme economic
crisis and urban unemployment. 16 Microfinance continued to spread through Latin
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America, to Colombia where the minimalist micro-lending institution Fundación Carvajal
began its programs in 1978 and to the Dominican Republic where Banco Ademi created a
loan fund for small street salesmen around the same time.17 The Latin American model of
microfinance soon took on a specific form of its own which we will discuss below.
In the 1990s, microfinance organizations and networks that had begun in Latin
America and Asia began to expand their programs into Africa, Eastern Europe, the
Middle East, and even to more developed, first world countries. Between 1990 and 1995,
FINCA International (Foundation for International Community Assistance), a
microfinance network that was founded in Bolivia, began new programs in Uganda and
Kyrgyzstan. Today, FINCA directs affiliates in five African countries, seven Eurasian
countries, and two Middle Eastern countries in addition to its original Latin American
branches.18 The Bangladesh Rehabilitations Assistance Committee (BRAC), which gave
its first loans in Bangladesh in 1974, developed programs in Africa in 1994 and now
works in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone.19 Microfinance is now a global phenomenon that has been
widely accepted as an important way to reach out to the world’s poor. Today, the World
Bank estimates that over seven thousand microfinance institutions serve approximately
sixteen million people worldwide.20 For those who work in microfinance, the question is
no longer if small loans have the potential to help the poor, but how and to whom these
microloans should be administered.
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Lending Strategies: Development and Debate
Since the Grameen Bank presented its initial formula for micro-lending through
group loans and a focus on women from the poorest communities, much of microfinance
strategy has been reformed and rethought by new institutions. The majority of
microfinance organizations have in fact now departed from a non-profit, charitable focus
to more of a business outlook on the services that they provide. Today we can highlight
four major debates over the intended mission and structure of micro-lending as an
initiative. The first is whether group or individual loans are more effective in helping
clients to improve their businesses and lives. The second is whether microfinance
institutions should focus their services on the absolute poor or on the relative poor as
clients. The third debate centers on the sole provision of credit versus the provision of
credit as well as other financial services and training. Finally, the fourth debate asks
whether microfinance organizations should continue their original non-profit mission or
become commercialized and make profit from their clients. Upon review of these
debates, it is clear that each perspective possesses distinct benefits and pitfalls, both for
organizations and clients themselves.
As Muhammad Yunus outlines in Banker to the Poor, the clear benefits of group
loans lie in group solidarity and support and the placement of responsibility and power in
the clients’ hands. Group pressure motivates clients to pay back their loans in a timely
fashion, therefore avoiding the need for client hassling by the institution. Group members
can support each other in times of economic trouble and thus can build up a positive
credit history together as a collective.21 As Malcolm Harper emphasizes in “What’s
Wrong with Groups?” group membership provides individuals with an easier and more
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organized way to begin saving their money. It also gives many women the opportunity to
leave the home and participate in a social collective for the first time, allowing them new
confidence and agency, while taking responsibility and extra work out of the hands of the
organization.22 Group loaning systems still dominate the strategy of certain organizations,
namely Grameen-affiliated programs and branches of the FINCA network, and remain
most effective in rural and extremely poor areas.23
A newer argument for the provision of individual credit focuses on the freedom
that an individual loan gives the client in terms of money, time, and responsibility.
Harper points out that group loans are inflexible, often fixing loan sizes at values that are
too low and loan terms on cycles that are too long in the eyes of clients. Group meetings
pose a significant time burden for many women who work around the clock at their small
businesses in order to sustain their families and pay back their credit. They must close
their shops for an hour or more to attend weekly meetings, and thus lose essential
business. Finally, membership in a group gives extra, unwanted responsibility to each
client—the need to look out for weaker members or guarantee the larger loans of the
strongest members.24 On the contrary, individual clients can take out loans that are much
higher because they are not pulled down by the vulnerability of others in their group.
They can decide their loan terms personally without having to make limiting
compromises. An individual client is responsible only for herself and has more time to
grow her enterprise. This individual loan model has been adapted by a large number of
microfinance institutions today, including BancoSol of Bolivia and other ACCION
International affiliates, and has been considered ideal for the moderately poor client.25
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This distinction between moderately and extremely poor clients brings us to the next
debate among microfinance theorists.
The justification for designing microfinance programs to serve the poorest
populations remains simple: Muhammad Yunus proved the poor to be reliable clients,
and they are the most in need of access to credit and formal assistance. As previously
discussed, the Grameen Bank model demonstrated in the 1970s that very poor individuals
took their loans seriously and worked harder than any other client group to pay them back
responsibly. Collateral was not even a necessity to guarantee the faithfulness of these
highly vulnerable clients.26 In addition, many microfinance institutions see service to the
most poor as a moral imperative. The rhetoric of microfinance speaks of goals to
eradicate poverty worldwide, and it could be considered “false advertising” for an
organization to preach such rhetoric while simultaneously ignoring the lowest sector of
the poor population.27 As David Hulme clarifies in “Is microdebt good for poor people?”
those clients whose standard of living truly lies below national poverty lines are the most
in need of microfinance’s services. They are the most vulnerable to crisis and the most
plagued by a basic lack of human rights and survival tools.28 Therefore, it has been
argued that these extremely poor clients must be the first priority of every microfinance
institution—as Muhammad Yunus declared when he first started the Grameen Bank, a
small loan could truly make the difference in their survival.
In past decades, a newer argument for serving the relatively poor instead of the
extreme poor has emerged among microfinance theorists and institutions, which declares
that debt is too risky and damaging for the poorest members of society and that a
microfinance organization can work much more efficiently if it serves the relatively poor.
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Weiss and Montgomery argue that high repayment rate among the poorest clients does
not necessarily reflect the capacity to pay, but instead could be a symptom of excessive
social pressure and even fear. “Microdebt” poses an extreme risk and source of stress for
the very vulnerable poor who have no resources or monetary cushion to fall back on.
Weiss and Montgomery therefore suggest that microfinance is not the ideal mechanism to
assist the most poor and that programs such as food subsidies or workfare would be more
effective.29 Serving the relatively poor instead of the extreme poor is also seen as more
beneficial for microfinance organizations. Less training and support is needed for
relatively poor clients because most of them already own small businesses and possess
entrepreneurial skills. The relatively poor are viewed as less risky and can provide
collateral, and therefore the institution can guarantee the repayment of its clients’ loans
and can work towards financial sustainability.30 For these reasons—client service and
organizational efficiency—many microfinance institutions have departed from the
historical focus on the extreme poor to a more practical client base of the relatively poor.
The third debate among microfinance theorists focuses on the range of services
that a microfinance institution should provide. One side of the debate reflects a
minimalist approach, stating that the sole responsibility of a microfinance organization
should be to provide credit to its clients. This argument rests on the belief that credit
alone, and the consequential increased income for an entrepreneur, can empower the
client to become a more confident and proactive individual. (This issue of empowerment
will be central to our later discussion.) Economic assistance is more than enough for
clients, argue minimalist theorists, and any further financial or social services such as
savings programs or health care should not be the responsibility of a microfinance
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organization as they lie outside of the organization’s realm of work.31 Other NGOs
should focus on the specific services beyond microcredit, and microfinance institutions
should keep their programs simple, focusing on their true mission: providing credit to the
poor.
A variety of microfinance institutions worldwide have begun to provide additional
services beyond basic credit to their clients, citing the emerging argument that
microfinance cannot combat gender inequality if it is not accompanied by a
comprehensive program of assistance for the poor women that it serves. Credit and
increased income only bring women halfway to empowerment, these theorists assert.
Hulme suggests the diversification of financial services which microfinance
organizations provide: “flexible savings, contractual savings, loans for education and
health, microinsurance and lines of credit.”32 He argues that just as poor women have
been barred from credit by formal banks, they have been barred from the variety of
services mentioned above and need and deserve those services equally. Only with such
diversification will poor microfinance clients have full power over their financial lives.
Matin, Sulaiman, and Saleque stress in “Imagining microfinance more boldly” that
microfinance institutions should in fact provide health care to clients by selecting and
training local health workers in their clients’ communities.33 Linda Mayoux advocates for
the provision of education on gender equality, stating that microfinance organizations
should provide “awareness training in gender issues for men and women to ensure that
microfinance leads to positive changes in women’s position rather than exacerbating
domestic conflict.”34 Many microfinance organizations have begun to operate some or all
of these additional services as part of their outreach package, in hopes of addressing
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issues of gender equality and female empowerment more comprehensively and
effectively. These “credit-plus” models of microfinance have been said to take an
organization’s social impact to the next level and to make its empowerment rhetoric more
valid.
Finally we come to the debate over non-profit versus commercialized
microfinance institutions. The first microfinance providers, including the Grameen Bank,
were non-profit organizations, and many continue a non-profit mission today, citing the
importance of sustainability and of treating the poor fairly as clients. Modern affiliates of
Grameen and FINCA, for example, call themselves “sustainable” because they cover all
costs of operation without retaining significant capital. These organizations maintain
themselves primarily by large donor contributions, and due to disinterest in profit they are
able to offer low interest rates and flexible loan terms to their clients.35 The ideological
justification for sustainability rests on the assertion that making a profit from the poor is
exploitative and morally wrong. Theorists who advocate for sustainability state that
newer, commercialized institutions are guilty of a “mission drift”—abandonment of the
original microfinance mission and of the people it should serve. Marguerite Berger writes
that commercialized organizations over-expand their client bases in search of profit, but
in doing so place the quantity of clients over the quality of service provided to those
clients.36 Weiss and Montgomery point out that for-profit microfinance institutions that
are regulated by formal banking systems must adhere to “tighter commercial criteria” that
will exclude poor clients from participation.37 Therefore, those institutions that wish to
remain loyal to the poor and to follow Muhammad Yunus’ original micro-lending
mission have maintained a non-profit structure.
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Commercialized, for-profit microfinance has risen in popularity in the past two
decades and has been supported by many microfinance theorists for two reasons: the
ability to reach more clients and the ability to provide a wider range of financial services
to clients. These organizations assert that the extra capital gained from commercialization
gives them the financial power and reach to serve a much greater number of clients, thus
providing credit and other services to many more people who would not have received
them otherwise.38 Theorists who support the for-profit method of microfinance counter
the common argument that quality of service is undermined by commercialization by
pointing out that commercialized institutions have a greater capacity to provide services
beyond credit to their clients. The provision of savings accounts, microinsurance, and
other financial services which clients so often demand of microfinance organizations
often requires a banking license and thus the switch to formal, for-profit operation.39
Many microfinance organizations have seen this as a necessary change: becoming a
commercialized institution allows them to better adopt the popular “credit-plus” model of
micro-lending discussed above. Today, for-profit microfinance organizations have
become powerful actors on the world stage: according to 2005 statistics, 45 of the top
specialized microfinance institutions worldwide outperform the top 10 global banking
institutions.40 Whether this grand success is a triumph for microfinance or a corruption of
its original goals and rhetoric remains a constant source of dispute.
It has been over seventy-five years since microfinance first took root in
Bangladesh, Brazil, and beyond, and it has evolved into a multifaceted industry whose
strategies vary widely. The debates over group versus individual loans, service to the
extreme poor versus to the relatively poor, the provision of simple credit versus varied
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financial services, and sustainability versus profitability all demonstrate through their
costs and benefits that there is no one way to operate as a microfinance institution. From
these variations in strategy and rhetoric we learn that microfinance has become a word
with multiple meanings and that its original form cannot be preserved. We now turn to
the Latin American model of microfinance, and the specific strategies that have
developed and prevailed in this region.

Microfinance in Latin America
Historically, microfinance institutions throughout Latin America have followed
the individual lending model and have served the relative poor over the extreme poor.
These two characteristics can be traced back to the first successful microfinance
organization in Latin America, BancoSol of Bolivia. This institution began as a response
to vast urban unemployment during the collapse of the Bolivian federal government in
the 1970s. BancoSol operated to provide credit to individual urban entrepreneurs, who
already possessed business skills but needed assistance to regain their livelihoods.41
BancoSol set the stage for other Latin American microfinance organizations, and today
individual loans to relatively poor clients are the trend in Latin America. As of 2006 only
ten percent of microloans in Latin America were given to groups, mostly from FINCA
affiliates and the Mexican institution Compartamos. In addition, because three-quarters of
the population of Latin America lives in urban areas, relatively poor urban clients have
been the great focus of microfinance services in this region.42 According to Berger in An
Inside View of Latin American Microfinance, serving the most poor is usually not seen
as the industry’s goal in Latin America, as most microfinance organizations aim to
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strengthen those who are already participants in the informal economy. However, there
exist prominent organizations in the region that specifically focus on the poorest female
clients, such as Mi Banco, which operates in Peru. Thus the Latin American model of
microfinance represents the full spectrum of lending models and client poverty levels,
although primarily focusing on relatively poor clients and individual loans.43
Latin American microfinance organizations have seen a recent transition from
non-profit, sustainable institutions that offer simple credit to a growing number of
commercialized for-profit institutions offering “credit-plus” models with a wide range of
services. As Berger elucidates, microfinance in Latin America started with institutions
that were not profit-focused and that relied heavily on private donors to sustain their
operations. But as these institutions grew, donor dependence became riskier and more
difficult and profitability became a more practical way to serve the large client bases that
these organizations had accumulated.44 A number of Latin American microfinance
providers, such as Compartamos of Mexico and Finamerica of Colombia, have since the
1990s undergone a process that Berger calls “upgrading”: the conversion of a
nongovernmental organization into a regulated financial institution that gains profit.45
Consequently, these organizations have used their new financial capacity to offer
additional services beyond credit at the request of their clients. More diverse financial
packages, especially with savings programs, have been adopted by many of these newly
commercialized organizations. They have also added a variety of services to contribute to
equality and empowerment, such as “basic educational initiatives in health and literacy”,
“financial education and business training”, and “management or skills training.”46 While
the loaning model and client base of Latin American microfinance providers remain
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relatively static, it is these aspects of commercialization and additional services that have
been constantly developing over the past decades in the region.
It is important to recognize the dangers of recent microfinance commercialization
in Latin America—microfinance organizations can easily transform into machines for the
exploitation of the poor as they sell themselves to powerful banks and raise interest rates
to unethical levels. The legal regulation of a microfinance organization is in fact possible
without its conversion into a for-profit institution: organizations that operate “credit-plus”
models and receive savings deposits from their clients must become regulated by formal
financial institutions for transparency purposes. Thus, many non-profit microfinance
institutions follow legal financial regulations while maintaining their sustainability and
low interest rates. However, when a microfinance organization chooses to sell its
ownership to a commercial bank and earn profit from its clients, the original povertyfighting mission of microfinance can be lost. Neil MacFarquhar, in his recent New York
Times article, reports that sixty percent of today’s microfinance clients worldwide are
served by banks and finance firms, which generally charge their clients anywhere from
70 to 125 percent in interest rates. For example, Compartamos, one of Mexico’s largest
and most successful microfinance institutions, recently earned “$458 million through a
public stock sale in 2007” and today charges an average of 82 percent interest to its
clients. Poor clients, tricked by the clever advertising of organizations like Compartamos,
often find themselves mired in debt. The commercialization of microfinance can lead
institutions to worsen the poverty of their clients, and therefore we must be wary of its
recent rise in popularity across Latin America.47
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The country of Honduras poses an interesting case in the Latin American world of
microfinance. Today there exist seventeen operating microfinance institutions in
Honduras, including FINCA Honduras, ACCION’s affiliate BanCovelo, and World
Relief. The first microfinance organization to begin operations in Honduras was
Hermandad de Honduras (HDH) in 1977, but the vast majority of Honduran
organizations were founded in the 1990s.48 Honduran microfinance is an interesting case
in the region first because its institutions offer significantly more group loans than in
most Latin American countries. Organizations like FINCA Honduras and Genesis
Microfinance follow the solidarity group model that was first pioneered by Muhammad
Yunus and the Grameen Bank. 49 Secondly, Honduras remains one of the last locations in
Latin America where non-profit microfinance clearly prevails. Berger elucidates the
factors that contribute to this continuing non-profit trend: “Only in Colombia and
Honduras does the non-profit model continue to be the driving force… In Honduras, very
low levels of required capitalization and the ability of non-profit institutions not regulated
by the banking authorities to capture deposits has made it easier for NGO microfinance
institutions to remain as such.”50 In general, the extreme poverty of Honduras in
comparison with surrounding countries contributes to these differences within the
microfinance industry in terms of lending models and profitability. Its depressed
conditions as a nation make it an ideal location for microfinance to meet the needs of
poor entrepreneurs, while Honduras simultaneously faces difficulties in making its
microfinance industry grow to the level of influence of its neighbors. These specific
characteristics of Honduran microfinance provide a context for our discussion and
investigation of the empowerment of Honduran women through microfinance.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE QUESTION OF EMPOWERMENT

Defining Empowermenta
Microfinance institutions worldwide, when advertising the impact of their
services, continually use the word “empowerment” to specifically describe the positive
changes that access to credit can bring to women’s lives. But “empowerment” remains an
ambiguous term that many of these organizations neglect to define. Joy DeshmukhRanadive and Ranjani K. Murthy, in Microcredit, Poverty and Empowerment, define
empowerment as the process of the achievement of personal agency through the removal
of economic, psychological, and socio-cultural barriers that were once kept in place by
formal institutions and social norms. The empowered individual is transformed from a
“passive recipient” of existing social and economic conditions to an “active participant”
in the world around her, making individual decisions that give her the power to affect her
future.1 Economic empowerment, psychological empowerment, and socio-cultural
empowerment are all concepts that have been individually debated and quantified.
Economic empowerment may refer to financial independence or the gain of necessary
funds for health or education expenses, for example. Psychological empowerment
suggests various possible increases in personal confidence. Socio-cultural empowerment
can encompass a number of improvements in gender norms, such as the betterment of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
a

The empowerment of the client is one of three projected impacts of microfinance on women, as outlined
by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen in their influential “capability approach” on social justice and
individual quality of life. Only empowerment and its specific meanings are relevant to our discussion, but
the other two equally important impacts on the client are capacity building and provisioning. A
microfinance organization builds the capacities of a client by bringing out her natural human capabilities,
which may have been previously barred by her poverty and lack of access to resources such as education.
An organization achieves capacity building through the provision or facilitation of necessary “material and
social resources” to the client. When she is able to fully exercise her capabilities as an economic
participant, the female microfinance client can empower herself as a woman. (quoted in Alexander 2)
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marital equality and bargaining relationships in the household or female community
organizing.2 Our discussion of empowerment will be broken up by these three factors and
we will discuss the details of their manifestations further below. Theorists disagree on
which aspect is most essential, and if all of these aspects or only one of them is necessary
to fully empower the woman as a microfinance client. I will argue that all three aspects
must be achieved together in order for an organization to claim that it has fully
empowered its clients.
In any discussion of the empowerment of women by microfinance, there are two
sources of discrepancy that must be taken into account. The first is whether the specific
microfinance organization being discussed provides a credit-only model to its clients or a
credit-plus model with extra financial and social services. Some argue that simple access
to credit is the only necessary catalyst of empowerment, citing a “virtuous spiral”
argument which states that the increase in income from a microloan will automatically
kick-start a number of psychological, social, and cultural improvements in the client’s
life.3 Other theorists are more skeptical of this virtuous spiral, asserting that credit may
address practical needs in a client’s life but cannot automatically have a significant effect
on entrenched social conditions and gender norms. These theorists advocate for the
credit-plus model as a more feasible catalyst for the empowerment of women,
highlighting the importance of extra financial services to achieve economic
empowerment and extra social and educational services to achieve psychological and
socio-cultural empowerment.4 A second source of discrepancy is the social and economic
context in which a microfinance organization is operating. Conditions in South Asian
countries versus Latin American countries, for example, differ significantly in terms of
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economic structure and gender inequality and oppression. In India, for example, a strong
socioeconomic caste system exists which constrains individuals to certain poverty levels,
and social conventions such as the dowry contribute to gender inequalities.5 In Honduras,
in contrast, an inflated informal sector of the economy makes for saturated markets that
intensify competition between small businesses, and the cultural notion of machismo
contributes to the view of women as weak and unintelligent.6 When we examine the
ability of a particular microfinance organization to empower its female clients, we must
keep in mind these factors of provided services and national context as essential
contributors to that institution’s success.

Incidence and Feasibility of Economic Empowerment
Throughout previous studies conducted on the empowerment of women through
microfinance, the primary positive indicators of economic empowerment found have
been financial independence, the ability to contribute significantly to family income, and
the increased capacity to pay essential living costs such as health care, food, and
education. In 2007, Rebecca Vonderlack-Navarro and Margaret Sherraden conducted
research on economic and social impacts for female clients of the organization Genesis
Microfinance outside of Tegucigalpa, Honduras. According to their interviews, twentyone of the thirty women who lived with a spouse or partner declared that because of their
microloans they felt financially independent from their husbands for the first time. These
women were able to make their own purchases in the local market and now worried less
about money.7 As Naila Kabeer reports in her 2001 account of research conducted in
Bangladesh with female clients of SEDP, a significant portion of interviewees declared
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that with their microloans they were able to contribute equally to family income and thus
had reached equality of economic status with their husbands and other family members.8
This significant increase in income and economic equality allows many female clients to
pay important living costs and thus improve the well-being of their families, to which
Susan Johnson provides an example in “Gender Relations, Empowerment, and
Microcredit: Moving on from a Lost Decade.” Her study with FINCA in Malawi shows
that food expenditure and quality of food consumption is significantly higher for the
families of women who receive microloans than for those who do not.9 From these three
specific examples of financial independence and equality and improvement of living
standards, we see women gaining agency as they break down economic barriers. Thus
these microfinance organizations have effectively helped their female clients to achieve
economic empowerment. The personal economic effects of microloans remain
complicated, however, and thus we arrive at our discussion of indicators of economic
stagnation or disempowerment for female clients of microfinance.
The primary indicators of a lack of economic empowerment—or even of
disempowerment—caused by microfinance are its inability to fully pull the individual out
of poverty and the excessive control that it exerts over clients through debt. Serena
Cosgrove, in her study with clients of the Salvadoran Foundation for Integral Support
(FUSAI), writes that microloans have helped these individuals improve their businesses,
their incomes, and their standard of living, but do not have the capacity to help them rise
significantly above the poverty line. Clients of this microfinance organization reflect the
common trend of relative improvement but a chronic inability to truly advance due to the
constant necessity of loan repayment. The director of FUSAI himself tells Cosgrove:
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“Really all we are doing is helping people survive… We are not helping them get out of
poverty. We are just helping them not to get poorer.”10 Hunt and Kasynathan, in
“Pathways to Empowerment?”, even cite evidence that the constant debt experienced by
microfinance clients can set them back financially. Research conducted with BRAC
clients shows a negative correlation between ownership of assets and length of
membership with the organization. BRAC clients report that they have needed to sell
personal assets in order to repay their debts.11 Debt can be an especially risky situation
for the poor individuals who are clients of microfinance. David Hulme explains that for a
microfinance client who finds herself in the midst of an economic crisis or natural
disaster, the repayment of loans becomes nearly impossible because she possesses little
collateral or savings as a cushion. He asserts that “microdebt” can be more oppressive
than beneficial for the poor.12 b These arguments on the negative financial aspects of
microfinance demonstrate to us that its economic effects are not always necessarily
empowering for the female client. Although female microfinance clients may become
economically empowered by increased income equality and well-being, the constancy of
debt may prevent them from further financial advancement and even pull them
downwards to a disempowered economic situation.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
b

When criticizing the financial risks of microfinance, we must keep in mind the significant economic
variables that remain out of the control of a microfinance organization. Most organizations work in
developing countries where economic crises are frequent and where individual risk in the operation of
small business is heightened by the saturated nature of informal markets. The poor clients that these
microfinance organizations serve are especially vulnerable in their management of debt not by the
organization’s fault, but as a function of their structurally reinforced poverty.
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Incidence and Feasibility of Psychological Empowerment
Previous research on women’s empowerment through microfinance has
demonstrated indicators of psychological empowerment that the access to credit can
catalyze: increased confidence, sense of agency, and self-respect. Vonderlack-Navarro
and Sherraden, in their study on Genesis Microfinance in Honduras, report that the
majority of their female respondents described an increase in confidence and self-esteem
since they had become clients of Genesis. One woman expressed that she felt a new sense
of pride because she finally had money of her own, stating that “I know what I have is
mine.” These clients also testified that they felt a greater sense of capability to run their
businesses, and were “more organized and focused” on their daily work.13 Hunt and
Kasynathan, in their study on BRAC clients in Bangladesh, reported similar results. All
but one women’s group interviewed by Hunt and Kasynathan expressed that the strongest
positive change that they had experienced as BRAC clients was an increase in selfrespect and confidence. According to these microfinance clients, they now felt that they
had “more value” as individuals within their families and surrounding communities. They
felt more capable to give advice to others and more deserving of respect from their
peers.14 These increases in confidence are some of the most widely reported positive
impacts of microfinance on the female client. In many cases reported by studies on
microfinance clients, it appears clear that the economic empowerment factors of
increased income and financial independence have a direct effect on psychological
empowerment through increased self-confidence.
The counterargument to such evidence of psychological empowerment lies in the
reported negative psychological effects on the individual from solidarity group power
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relations and debt anxiety. Linda Mayoux, through her research with a variety of
microfinance NGOs in Cameroon, found that those institutions that used a group lending
model experienced problems with power relations within groups. The poorer and more
disadvantaged women felt manipulated or pressured at times by the stronger members of
their solidarity group.15 As well, a client’s financial failure may have a painful
psychological impact on her as a solidarity group member, as groups often label
unsuccessful members as irresponsible or unintelligent in the community and thus
damage their reputation and social standing. In these cases the group model of
microfinance has proved much less effective than an individual model may have been, as
it causes psychological stress for certain clients. The pressure of debt creates a second
negative psychological effect cited by microfinance theorists, who declare that the state
of being in constant debt can instill fear and anxiety in poor clients and can cause them to
feel constantly guilty and vulnerable. Thomas Dichter, in “Can microcredit make an
already slippery slope more slippery?”, asserts that the existence of debt between the
individual and the microfinance provider immediately creates a psychological
relationship of power that can be exceedingly stressful or shameful for the client.16
Hulme writes that this power relationship between institution and client may even be a
source of perpetual fear for individuals, as they feel anxious about what may happen to
them and their families if they cannot pay their debt.17 Solidarity group tensions and debt
anxiety thus represent two sources of psychological detriment that participation in
microfinance programs can bring upon the client, in clear contradiction with the evidence
for its psychological empowerment possibilities.
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Incidence and Feasibility of Socio-cultural Empowerment
The idea of socio-cultural empowerment for women as an effect of
microfinance—essentially, the alleviation of normative gender inequalities in the
household and the community—is the most hotly contested concept in microfinance
theory. Whether a micro-lending institution truly has the power to change such deep-set
social conditions is a constant source of questioning and reexamination. The positive side
of the debate cites specific evidence from studies on female clients that show
improvement in marital relations and equality, increased community participation, and
the empowerment of the next generation of women in families through education. Naila
Kabeer, in her study on female SEDP clients in Bangladesh, presents detailed evidence of
the improvement of harmony within marriages and the increase in joint, equal decisionmaking between husband and wife. The majority of Kabeer’s interviewees stated that
since the start of their loans with SEDP, the increased financial prosperity of their
families had led to a release in tension within marriages and/or an increase in respect
received from husbands due to the client’s contribution to the family.18 As well, 90% of
interviewees reported that equality in decision-making between spouses had either
improved or retained its already positive status.19 Kabeer’s study also demonstrates a
mitigation of gender inequalities within the community for SEDP clients. Female clients
were now more likely to purchase land in their name and to travel to the market place,
both of which have traditionally been male activities.20 Finally, Hunt and Kasynathan
present evidence for the empowerment of clients’ daughters, and thus the next generation
of women in the community, through education. They found that girls were more likely
to be sent to school if their mothers were receiving microloans.21 These three indicators,
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among a variety of other factors in gender norm alleviation, are constantly looked for in
studies on microfinance and empowerment. From the examples above it is clear that
socio-cultural empowerment is indeed possible for women as an effect of microfinance.
We will now turn to the counterargument, which discusses possible detriments to marital
relations and the incapacity of microfinance to change social and cultural structure.
Critics of microfinance often declare that microfinance organizations project a
rhetoric of women’s empowerment through the transformation of gender norms that is
unfounded, and even at times the direct opposite of truth. A common theory states that
women’s access to credit creates tension in marriages as husbands feel threatened by their
wives’ new success or begin to pressure their wives into relinquishing the loan money to
them. These tensions may lead to an increase in domestic violence or the seizure of
clients’ loans by their husbands. Robin Isserles, in “Microcredit: The Rhetoric of
Empowerment, the Reality of ‘Development as Usual’”, cites a study conducted with
Grameen clients in Bangladesh which showed that 57 percent of female clients saw a rise
in spousal verbal aggression since the start of their loans, and 13 percent a rise in both
verbal and physical violence.22 Ann Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta, in their widely
cited 1996 study with a variety of microfinance organizations in Bangladesh, report that
63% of female clients interviewed showed partial to no control over their own
microloans, which in most cases had passed into the hands of their husbands.23 In these
examples, the provision of microloans to women in fact worsened the gender dynamics
within their households. Other theorists simply state that a small loan does not have the
capacity to reverse long-standing socio-cultural conditions, and that only credit-plus
models of microfinance can hope to make even incremental changes towards gender
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equality for microfinance clients. Linda Mayoux, in her research in Cameroon, found that
female clients had not significantly challenged the gender inequality that they
experienced in the home or in the community, although the organization asserted that
such changes would take place.24 Mayoux, like many skeptical microfinance theorists,
advocates strongly for a “credit-plus” model of microfinance that specifically provides
social and educational services aimed at alleviating gender inequalities. She writes that
measures such as “awareness training in gender issues for men and women” and
“provision of services to decrease reproductive work to give women more time for
income-earning and for wider social and political activities” are necessary steps that any
microfinance organization must take if it hopes to fully empower its female clients.25 The
debate over socio-cultural empowerment remains at a gridlock between clear evidence on
both sides. One fact remains true in this continual discussion: if microfinance
organizations are to claim female empowerment and the alleviation of gender inequalities
as impacts of their services on the individual, they must take specific measures to provide
concrete and lasting results for their clients.
These economic, psychological, and socio-cultural factors in the empowerment of
women must hold equal weight in our discussion of microfinance and in the mission of
microfinance organizations that truly aim to change the lives of their female clients. A
simple increase in income does not automatically make an empowered woman, and it is
with this knowledge that we continue to research and investigate the feasibility and
strategic possibilities of empowerment through microfinance. I add the results from my
recent work in Honduras with the microfinance organization FINCA to this constantly
developing pool of investigations and literature. From my research I have come to my
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own conclusions on this debate over women, microfinance, and empowerment within the
Honduran context, which I will turn to as a case study and as the basis for my subsequent
discussion.

!

34

REFERENCES
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Deshmukh-Ranadive, Joy and Ranjani K. Murthy. “Introduction: Linking the Triad.”
Microcredit, Poverty, and Empowerment. Eds. Neera Burra, Joy Deshmukh-Ranadive
and Ranjani K. Murthy. New Delhi: United Nations Development Programme, 2005. p.
45.
2
Mayoux 238
3
Deshmukh-Ranadive and Murthy 46
4
Ibid
5
Hunt, Juliet and Nalini Kasynathan. “Pathways to empowerment? Reflections on
microfinance and transformation in gender relations in South Asia.” Gender and
Development 9.1 (2001): 42-52. p. 47. Academic Search Premier Database, 7 Nov 2009.
6
Isserles, Robin G. “Microcredit: The Rhetoric of Empowerment, the Reality of
‘Development as Usual.’” Women’s Studies Quarterly 3.4 (2003): 38-57. p. 48. JSTOR
Database, 10 Feb 2010.
7
Vonderlack-Navarro and Sherraden 75
8
Kabeer, Naila. “Conflicts over Credit: Re-Evaluating the Empowerment Potential of
Loans to Women in Rural Bangladesh.” World Development 29.1 (2001): 63-84. p. 71.
Academic Search Premier Database, 7 Nov 2009.
9
Johnson, Susan. “Gender Relations, Empowerment, and Microcredit: Moving on from a
Lost Decade.” European Journal of Development Research 17.2 (2005): 224-248. p. 236.
Academic Search Premier Database, 7 Nov 2009.
10
Cosgrove, Serena. “Levels of Empowerment: Marketers and Microenterprise-Lending
NGOs in Apopa and Nejapa, El Salvador.” Latin American Perspectives 29.5 (2002): 4865. p. 57. JSTOR Database, 7 Nov 2009.
11
Hunt and Kasynathan 46
12
Hulme 19
13
Vonderlack-Navarro and Sherraden 77
14
Hunt and Kasynathan 48
15
Mayoux, Linda. “Tackling the Down Side: Social Capital, Women’s Empowerment
and Microfinance in Cameroon.” Development and Change 32 (2001): 421-450. p. 440.
Academic Search Premier Database, 7 Nov 2009.
16
Dichter, Thomas. “Can microcredit make an already slippery slope more slippery?
Some lessons from the social meaning of debt.” What’s Wrong with Microfinance? Eds.
Thomas Dichter and Malcolm Harper. Eastbourne, UK: Intermediate Technology
Publications Ltd., 2007. p. 11.
17
Hulme 20
18
Kabeer 71
19
Kabeer 73
20
Kabeer 76
21
Hunt and Kasynathan 46
22
Isserles 49
23
Goetz, Anne Marie and Rina Sen Gupta. “Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and
Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh.” World Development
24.1 (1996): 45-63. p. 49. Academic Search Premier Database, 10 Feb 2010.
24
Mayoux 439

!

35

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
"#Mayoux 239

!

36

CHAPTER THREE: HONDURAN CONTEXT

Honduras Overview
The research that will be presented in this thesis was conducted in 2009 in the
republic of Honduras. Honduras is located in Central America, bordering Guatemala to
the northwest and El Salvador and Nicaragua to the southwest and southeast,
respectively. Honduras is roughly the size of the state of Tennessee, measuring 43,277
square miles. The Honduran climate is temperate in the mountainous inland regions and
tropical in the coastal lowlands. The population as last recorded in 2008 was 7,241,503,
with approximately twenty percent of Hondurans living in the two major cities, the
central capital of Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula in the north.
Honduras varies significantly from neighbors such as Guatemala in its high ethnic
homogeneity—about ninety percent of Hondurans are mestizo (mixed indigenous and
European) with seven percent of the population as indigenous, two percent black, and one
percent white. This homogeneity contributes significantly to linguistic unity within the
country—the national language is Spanish with almost no representation of other
indigenous languages. Religious affiliation is also highly consistent nationwide, as eighty
percent of Hondurans identify as Roman Catholic, with the remaining portion of the
population belonging to various Protestant denominations.
Honduras’ Human Development Index value is 0.714, which ranks it 117th out of
the 194 nations in the world and clearly places it in the “third world” category of
development and living standards. The infant mortality rate in Honduras is 27 per every
1,000 births. Life expectancy according to 2006 estimates is 67.1 years for men and 72.8
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years for women. It is critical to understand the origins of Honduras’ extremely low
standard of living, which makes it an essential climate for microfinance. The continual
underdeveloped status that Honduras suffers has been catalyzed and perpetuated by its
difficult political, economic, and social history, which we will now cover.1 2 3

Political History and Current Status
Honduras achieved independence from Spain in 1821 as a member of the Central
American Federation of states, and became its own sovereign nation in 1839.4 Honduras
has seen long periods of military rule since 1839 and its political history has been
characterized by dictatorships and frequent military coups. Successive government
overthrows have been catalyzed primarily by ongoing conflict between the two major
political parties—the conservative Partido Nacional (PN) and the liberal Partido Liberal
(PL). For example, in 1954 PL candidate José Villeda was elected president, but was
soon overthrown in 1956 by his PR opponent Julio Lozano with the support of a military
junta. The military then held elections in 1957 and Villeda was re-elected as Honduran
president. General Oswaldo López, Minister of Defense, subsequently toppled Villeda in
1963 and was officially elected in 1965, running on the platform of a new constitution.5
Clashes continued in this manner until 1981, when general elections were successfully
held and Partido Liberal candidate Roberto Suazo gained an absolute majority. Although
the government technically lay in civilian hands at this time, ties between military and
state remained tightly knit. For many years, disappearances of social activists and human
rights abuses were frequently carried out at the hands of the military. 6 Finally, in 1999
constitutional amendments were passed that significantly reduced the power of military
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juntas and separated military officers from executive positions.7 But Honduras has not
fully cured itself of political fluctuation and military influence, as we will discuss below.
High political instability and harsh dictatorial rule over the Honduran population are
elemental factors that have undermined its people’s freedoms and stunted its growth.
The Honduran government is today characterized as a democratic Republic and
its structure consists of three major branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The
executive branch includes the president and cabinets. The National Congress is the sole
actor in the legislative branch, to which deputies are elected from each of the 18 regional
departments. The judiciary branch is comprised of the nine-member Supreme Court and
the Courts of Appeal. Honduras’ constitution was last revised in 1995, and upholds a
number of basic citizen rights such as freedom of speech and religion, the right to habeas
corpus, and the right to equal pay for equal work. The death penalty and abortion are both
outlawed in Honduras. The Honduran government grants universal suffrage to all citizens
over the age of 18, and a new president is elected every four years by popular vote. 8 Due
to various reforms, the election process and other government operations and programs
have increasingly included Honduran women in recent years.
Honduras was the final country in Latin America to grant suffrage to women and
has only recently begun to outline specific government programs that support women.
Honduran women secured the right to vote in 1955. Honduras still has not had a female
president, but women have held important offices such as vice president and mayor and
in 2001 they obtained 9.4 percent of the seats in the National Congress. In 1997, PN
candidate Nora Gunera was the first female to run for president in Honduras. Honduras
has also recently responded to United Nations pressure to reduce gender inequalities and
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created a National Policy for Women in 1989, after the first UN Decade for Women. This
policy aimed to provide economic support for women and equality in specific
employment sectors and environmental policy, for example. The concrete effects of such
legislative assistance for women remain to be proved in Honduras.9
In June 2009, a political crisis occurred in Honduras that has triggered profound
losses in governmental legitimacy and national welfare. President Manuel Zelaya, elected
in 2005 as a member of the Partido Liberal, was removed by military coup from office
and exiled to Costa Rica on the 28th of June. Zelaya had proposed a constitutional
amendment that would remove the one-term limit to presidential service and make
indefinite presidency a looming possibility, and had ignored significant resistance to the
referendum from his National Congress and advisors. The Congress subsequently
directed the military to overthrow Zelaya by force, and replaced him with the president of
Congress, Roberto Micheletti.10 Relative stability was finally reached again in Honduras
in January 2010, when newly elected president Porfirio Lobo took office,11 but the nation
had already felt extreme detriments to its international relations and economic well-being.
While Micheletti held the presidency, he significantly undermined civil liberties and
many Hondurans were not permitted to leave their homes for days or to practice freedom
of speech.12 The international community responded overwhelmingly negatively to the
undemocratic transition of power from Zelaya to Micheletti. The Organization of
American States (OAS) suspended Honduras from membership for a period of time, and
the United States discontinued thirty million dollars in military and economic aid to the
small nation. Many countries cut off all trade with Honduras during Micheletti’s time in
office, and some have still refused to recognize the legitimacy of Lobo’s election.13
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Honduras’ economy, which was already on a downward spiral as a result of the global
economic crisis, has seen an unprecedented failure in the nine months since the coup—
tourism revenues, for example, have dropped over 70 percent.14 The economic downturn
felt in Honduras has been especially difficult for the poor, thus making microfinance a
difficult industry to sustain. These effects will be evident in my survey results, which
come from the direct aftermath of Honduras’ political crisis.

Economic History and Current Status
Honduras is a nation that has continually endured extreme poverty. Its GDP per
capita ranks the third lowest in all of Latin America, at $4,200 as estimated in 2009.15
Equally revealing is the fact that approximately 64 percent of the Honduran population
lives below the poverty line, and even more Hondurans live in relative poverty.16 A very
small portion of the Honduran population truly possesses the finances and resources to
live in comfort. The Honduran national income gap is exceptionally wide: the richest
twenty percent of Hondurans control 61.8 percent of the country’s wealth, while the
poorest twenty percent owns only 1.6 percent of national wealth.17 In the world economy,
Honduras remains highly vulnerable, ranking 113th worldwide in external debt with
$3.315 billion dollars owed internationally.18 Honduras’ poverty and wealth gap has been
linked to political instability and corrupt leadership throughout its history—
embezzlement and lack of government support have been common phenomena,
especially during the decades of military rule discussed above.19 Its underdevelopment
has also been clearly induced by dependent trade relationships and exploitative ties to
international economic institutions.
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Honduras’ narrow and foreign-controlled banana and coffee industries historically
made it the classic “banana republic” throughout the twentieth century, until recent
decades when it moved towards market diversification and complete trade liberalization,
which have brought new forms of foreign exploitation to the country. Throughout the
twentieth century large corporations such as Chiquita and Dole managed the production
and export of bananas in Honduras, and the small nation was unable to develop its own
elite experts in the economic sector. Much of national revenues from banana and coffee
production were lost to foreign hands.20 In the 1990s, Honduras finally began to diversify
its economy by developing its shrimp and melon industries, for example, and reduced its
complete dependence on large corporations. In the new millennium it adopted free trade
policies under pressure from the United States and international organizations such as the
IMF and the World Bank. In 2000 Honduras was granted NAFTA parity—the same
access to American markets and trade liberalization as NAFTA members.21 In 2006 it
formed the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with surrounding
nations.22 The effects of free trade in Honduras have been mixed, as in many
impoverished and vulnerable countries. Free trade has brought unprecedented Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) to Honduras, which has allowed for the same foreign control of
its economy as once existed through domination by Chiquita and Dole. Maquiladoras—
large factories run by foreign corporations that remain exempt from government taxes—
have become significant sources of employment but have extracted the vast majority of
their revenue from Honduras and have neglected the basic rights of their workers.23
Honduras remains a nation frequently exploited by more powerful economic actors and
has historically failed to retain supervision of its own industries and workers.
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The labor force in Honduras is primarily concentrated in low-paying agriculture
and industrial jobs and in services such as small businesses.24 Employment in agriculture
has fallen significantly since the 1980s, as Honduras has seen a strong trend of ruralurban migration. Coffee farming, for example, has become more competitive and
commercialized and less lucrative for the common farmer. Growing numbers of
Hondurans have attempted to make a living through micro-businesses such as tortilla
stands or small convenient stores in urban areas, thus making the presence of
microfinance institutions increasingly essential in the country.25 For women, formal
employment is most available in the “feminized” sectors of the economy—maquiladora
manufacturing or domestic service. Honduran women, when involved in agriculture, take
part in the harvesting and packing of bananas and coffee. Nationwide, the average formal
woman’s salary is only thirty-five percent of the average man’s salary. But the vast
majority of Honduran women work in the informal sector as micro-entrepreneurs or in
subsistence agriculture.26 They are often too poor to register their businesses with the
government, and therefore are not included in official economic statistics—but
Honduras’ enormous informal sector plays a key supportive role in its economy and
Honduran women are therefore important economic actors. These women who manage
small enterprises in the informal sector are those who the Honduran microfinance
industry seeks to serve.
In October 1998, Honduras’ economy and infrastructure was completely
devastated by the catastrophic Hurricane Mitch, and the nation’s economic structure and
policies have been dominated by debt ever since. The hurricane destroyed Honduras’
agricultural industry, ruining seventy percent of banana crops and twenty percent of
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coffee crops among other losses. An estimate seven thousand Hondurans were killed by
Hurricane Mitch, and 1.5 million were left homeless. Mudslides and flooding leveled five
thousand telephone lines and over half of the country’s roads, making communication
essentially impossible throughout Honduras. The economic damage caused by Hurricane
Mitch came to a startling five billion dollars—95 percent of the country’s GDP in 1998.
The nation was plunged into extreme debt and in 1999 came to a relief agreement with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In exchange for one billion dollars of debt relief,
Honduras was required to restructure its economy according to IMF structural adjustment
program standards, which included widespread privatization, social security reforms, and
improved health care programs. Structural adjustment has thus brought certain benefits to
Honduras but has placed it in a position of constant dependence on foreign aid.
Honduras’ economy remains weak and underdeveloped today, and the nation’s poverty is
only one of many crippling effects on the progress and prosperity of Honduran women.

Social Norms: The Continual Subordination of Women
Honduran gender norms have historically granted men and women drastically
different social standing, defining their value as individuals according to opposite social
spheres and granting men the ultimate social, physical, and psychological power.
Machismo, the common Latin American system of cultural norms surrounding male
superiority, places Honduran men in the breadwinning role while requiring them
essentially no responsibility in the home. Male infidelity and desertion are common
phenomena that are normalized in Honduran culture. Domestic violence is also
widespread in Honduran homes. Meanwhile, female social norms are informed by
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marianismo, the counterpart to machismo in Honduran culture. Marianismo is based on
the ideal of the Virgin Mary as the perfect mother and woman, and therefore places
women on a pedestal solely in the sphere of the home.27 Julie Cupples explains this
dichotomy between marianismo and machismo: “Marianismo is based on notions of selfsacrificing motherhood, and consequently motherhood is elevated to a high status. The
coexistence of marianismo and machismo means that paradoxically, while women are
respected as mothers, they are degraded as women.”28 For Honduran women, these
limiting gender norms make the achievement of influence in the community or success in
business, for example, especially difficult. Microfinance’s specific focus on women is
therefore a necessary policy in Honduras, as it attempts to ease the normative exclusion
of women.
Early pregnancy and single motherhood are common occurrences for Honduran
women that make the support of a family in impoverished conditions especially
complicated. In Honduras, machismo and male sexual authority contributes to an
“extreme cultural resistance to the use of condoms.” Consequently, teen pregnancy rates
are high in Honduras, and such pregnancies rarely result in marriage of mother and
father. Informal cohabitation, called union libre, or free union, is popular in Honduras
among poor families because of the money and legal paperwork required for official
marriage. Free unions, however, are much more likely to result in male desertion and
single motherhood, and an estimated fifty percent of Honduran households today are
headed by single mothers. Single Honduran mothers are especially economically
vulnerable because of the lack of a second income in their households. Therefore we will
find that single mothers make up a significant portion of microfinance clients in
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Honduras, as they seek extra assistance in supporting their families with one small
enterprise.29
Domestic violence is a widespread and often normalized form of oppression
against women in Honduras. A study by the UN Population Fund stated that
approximately eighty percent of Honduran women will experience domestic violence in
their lifetimes. In 1996, the Honduran city of Comayagua reported that sixty percent of
all police cases in that year had been due to domestic violence. Cupples writes, “the main
causes of domestic violence are seen to lie in cultural understandings of male dominance,
alcoholism, and the tendency to see domestic violence as a private problem rather than a
social or human rights issue.” Thus Honduran women have historically felt obligated to
quietly endure domestic violence instead of speaking out for their rights. Thankfully,
since 1998 specific legislature has been passed in the Honduran National Congress that
has made it easier for women to report domestic violence cases and has funded support
programs for battered women. No actual reduction in domestic violence incidence has
been proved, however. Honduran women continue to face significant obstacles in the
community and the home that bar them from gaining equal social standing and respect.30
In response to these obstacles of sexist social norms, frequent single motherhood, and
domestic violence, microfinance has been employed in nations such as Honduras as a tool
to attempt to empower women and combat the gender inequalities that they face.
The perpetually difficult political, economic, and social conditions in Honduras
have brought instability, poverty, and inequality to its women since the nation’s birth.
Hondurans have seen years of corrupt and dictatorial politics, economic exploitation and
crisis, and stark gender inequalities that have made survival as a poor Honduran woman
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even more of a struggle. Microfinance has therefore been viewed as a necessary
development tool and alleviator of inequality in Honduras. The female microfinance
clients whose stories and statistics we will consider—all served by the non-profit
microfinance organization FINCA Honduras —present strong examples of the daily
hardships that Honduran women face and of the possibilities to improve their lives and
empower them economically, psychologically, and socio-culturally through microcredit.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINCA HONDURAS AND SURVEY METHODOLOGY

FINCA Honduras
The research that will be presented in this thesis was carried out solely with
clients of FINCA Honduras. FINCA Honduras is a branch of FINCA International, a
non-profit microfinance organization that works “to provide financial services to the
world’s lowest-income entrepreneurs so they can create jobs, build assets, and improve
their standard of living.”1 FINCA was founded in 1984 by John Hatch and gave its first
small loan in El Salvador. Since then, it has grown to provide its services to the poor in
22 countries worldwide in Latin America, Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.
FINCA Honduras began in 1989 and works to serve clients from 12 offices across the
country. In each office work about fifteen employees, with a branch director, credit
supervisors, and client officers. Branch directors and credit supervisors maintain the
organization of budgets, client officers’ schedules, services to clients, and all other daily
activity of the office. The client officers act as liaisons between the organization and its
clients. They spend each day in the field attending group meetings and visiting clients
individually to complete loan distribution and repayments and to monitor and provide
support for the progress of each client’s project. These are the FINCA employees who
truly make the individual transformative work of the organization possible.
FINCA Honduras is a non-profit microfinance organization that provides group
loans primarily to women. FINCA clients take out small loans primarily in groups called
“village banks” in which they support each other in growing their businesses. Village
banks are made up of about ten members on average. Each village bank elects a directive
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board that holds the responsibility of managing the collective loans of the group and
group savings, among other tasks. 70 percent of FINCA’s clients worldwide are women,
and in Honduras they make up 80 percent. FINCA demonstrates a clear mission to focus
on women, in accordance with theories on the extended benefits of lending to women and
on possibilities for their empowerment.2 As women are especially disadvantaged and
poor in Honduras, this focus is an essential part of FINCA’s mission as a Honduran
microfinance organization.
FINCA Honduras tends to serve the relative poor as its client base and provides
additional “credit plus” services to its clients. The average loan taken out by a FINCA
Honduras client is $611 in United States dollars.3 This is an impressive average
considering Honduras’ income statistics: the estimated per capita income in Honduras is
$1,190, and almost half of Hondurans live on less than two US dollars a day.4 Such a
comparison between Honduran poverty standards and the loan capacity of FINCA
Honduras’ average client proves that this microfinance organization serves the relative
poor instead of the most poor in Honduras. Those Hondurans who are able to access
FINCA’s services benefit from its “credit plus” model, which provides savings practice
and an emerging health insurance program. A monthly savings deposit into the village
bank’s communal fund is required of all clients, and this money is used in case of
emergency or taken out for specific needs as voiced by group members and approved by
their associates. Starting in 2009, FINCA Honduras also began to provide health
insurance to its clients—all clients are required to make a small monthly deposit towards
health insurance in addition to their savings, and in exchange they are guaranteed full
coverage of any hospital expenses or large medical bills when health emergencies arise in
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their families. The obligatory nature of these two services is controversial, as it may
simply add an extra economic burden to certain clients already struggling to pay back
their FINCA loans on time. FINCA Honduras has seen these additional client services as
a sign of progress for the organization, however, and continues to promote the “credit
plus” model of microfinance as the best way to reach its moderately poor clients. c

Interning with FINCA
From June 1st to August 1st, 2009, I worked as an intern with FINCA Honduras.
Seeking to study women and social change through microfinance, I secured an internship
with FINCA Honduras and was given a specific assignment by the research branch of
FINCA International. FINCA International sends representatives to its various affiliates
worldwide to conduct a standardized survey with clients called the FINCA Client
Assessment Tool (FCAT). The FCAT aims to “capture a detailed picture of the standard
of living of clients” and to “provide useful information for the development of products
and services.”5 I was given an abridged version of the FCAT to conduct with FINCA
clients in Honduras, which solely focused on specific standard of living indicators. My
job as an intern consisted of traveling between four different cities to carry out this
survey in person with clients.
FINCA Honduras directs local branches in eight small cities throughout the
country aside from the main FINCA headquarters in the capitol, Tegucigalpa. I spent my
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
c

Microfinance organizations, in their implementation of the “credit-plus” model, often encounter a conflict
between providing extra financial services to the client and increasing the possible financial burden on the
client. The logical way to fund additional services such as health insurance is through the increase of
interest rates on client loans, and “credit-plus” microfinance organizations can often only remain
financially stable by placing this greater burden on the client. Therefore it is difficult to draw the line
between the limitations of providing simple credit to the client and the pitfalls of raising interest rates in
order to fund additional services.
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internship conducting the FINCA survey in the cities of Copán, Progreso, Choluteca, and
Danlí, and I spent approximately two weeks in each location. These cities were chosen
specifically because they are well distributed geographically throughout Honduras, and
thus the results of my survey with FINCA clients from these different locations would be
most generalizable and reliable. From 8 AM to 5 PM each weekday and from 8 AM to 12
PM on Saturdays, I traveled out to different neighborhoods and villages with one client
officer per day. I followed him or her visiting clients and participating in village bank
meetings, and conducted the FINCA survey with those that we visited.
My aim to collect survey results from ten clients per day was often not
accomplished, due to misunderstanding and/or disorganization at the local branch level of
FINCA Honduras and more importantly, due to complications of the military coup that
occurred in the first month of my internship. I was in Progreso on the day of the coup,
June 28, 2009, and from that day onwards my results in Progreso were scarce due to
curfews that barred travel outside city borders and general insecurity in the streets. My
results in Danlí were also essentially nonexistent—only six interviews—because I was
staying there when the ousted president Zelaya attempted to enter the country twenty
minutes away at the border with Nicaragua. The city of Danlí was put on twenty-four
hour curfew for five days, and thus FINCA was unable to open its office and visits to
clients were cancelled. Nevertheless, I completed 170 interviews with FINCA clients
between the four Honduran cities of Copán, Progreso, Choluteca, and Danlí by the close
of my internship. The size and consistency of my aggregate sample of interviewees was
compromised by the named setbacks, as I conducted the majority of my interviews in
Copán and Choluteca and thus skewed the geographical generalizability of the survey.
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However, I followed specific FINCA guidelines to conduct this survey in the most
reliable and organized way possible, which I will outline below.

The FINCA Survey
The condensed version of the FCAT that I used during my internship consisted of
twenty-seven official FINCA survey questions, measuring a variety of indicators of
clients’ “Wealth, Health, Education, Empowerment, and Living standards.”6 From this
title the survey was referred to as the WHEEL. The WHEEL originally only contained
sixteen questions, but I was given the opportunity to choose other questions from the full
FCAT survey that interested me, and to expand the WHEEL by adding them to the end of
the survey. Although I could not form questions of my own, I was able to elaborate on a
number of the more closed or quantitative questions so as to gain more detail and
qualitative input from the client being interviewed. With these extra questions I was able
to increase the validity of my survey, as I could measure more closely what I originally
intended to study—the specific impact of FINCA’s services on the economic,
psychological, and socio-cultural empowerment of women. For example, following the
question “How would you rate your health at this time?” which gave interviewees five
response options on a scale from “excellent” to “very poor”, I asked clients if their
response to this question would have been different before they started their loans with
FINCA. I probed for details on changes in clients’ health over time since they had
become FINCA clients and on FINCA’s role in their wellbeing. Although I did not need
to report this extra information to FINCA, I recorded it for my own investigation and thus
was able to garner a variety of quantitative and qualitative data from my interviews.
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Each official FINCA survey question, whether quantitative or qualitative, was
made quantifiable by either a numerical answer or a defined set of possible responses.
Quantitative questions focused mainly on family size and education, family expenses in a
variety of areas, and specific characteristics of the client’s loan. For example, I asked
“How many school-aged children live in your home?”, “How much does your household
usually spend per week on transportation costs?”, and “What is the current length of your
loan cycle in months?” All of these questions required simple numerical answers.
Qualitative questions focused primarily on sanitation, health, confidence and happiness,
food security, and satisfaction with FINCA. All of these qualitative questions offered
defined possible responses for clients to choose from, but some of the questions offered
continuous responses while others were categorical. For example, the question “In
general, how satisfied are you with your life?” can be characterized as continuous,
because it asks for an answer on a scale from 1-10, with 1 as very unsatisfied and 10 as
very satisfied. Thus an average could be taken of the responses and the numerical value
of the chosen option specifically reflected the client’s response. The question on change
in client health, however, was categorical. It asked, “Has your health or the health of your
family changed since the start of your loans with FINCA?” and gave three options for the
interviewee to choose from: 1) “yes, positive change”, 2) “yes, negative change”, or 3)
“no change”. These options did not have any clear relation to their numerical value, and
an average of the responses would not have any meaning. These important distinctions
between question types will come into play in my analysis of the aggregate survey data.
To maintain the reliability of this survey, clients were chosen by random sample
for generalizability and interviews were conducted using palm pilot technology for
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reproducibility. Before going out into the field with a coworker, I would obtain the list of
the clients to be visited and randomly choose the order of interviews with a
randomization program in Excel on my computer. This randomization process was at
times compromised by disorganization or misunderstanding with clients, and in these
situations I would randomly choose clients for interviews by opening to a random page in
the client officer’s booklet, as each client was represented by his or her own client
information page. To conduct the survey, I was given a palm pilot by FINCA
International in which I entered all client responses, using a special Pendragon software
program that contained all of the survey questions and possible answers. Each client’s
full interview was saved in its own file within the palm pilot, and then transferred to an
aggregate Excel file on my laptop that organized all interviews into one data set. When I
completed my internship, I had all of my survey data in one Excel file on my computer
that could later be analyzed using specific SPSS software. I also carried a notebook and
pen with me at all times, and recorded clients’ explanations of their answers and their
responses to my elaborative questions on factors such as health and confidence. The palm
pilot data set and my written recordings of client quotes together make the whole of my
collected data from the FINCA survey.
With these twenty-seven questions and elaborations on client responses, I was
able to measure many of the indicators that interested me in my research on women,
microfinance, and empowerment. The vast majority of my interviewees were women—
151 out of 170 total clients interviewed. I was able to gain information on economic
empowerment through the questions on family expenses, health, and satisfaction with
one’s loan, for example. I was able to gain feedback on psychological empowerment
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through questions on confidence and happiness. Finally, I gained some information on
the clients’ socio-cultural empowerment with the question “Are you the head of your
household?” and clients’ subsequent explanations of their family dynamics. However, I
would have liked to ask more questions on gender relations in the home and/or female
participation the community through politics and other mediums. I was not given this
option because of my requirement to adhere to official FINCA survey content. The
FINCA survey was inadequate in a variety of ways to measure the indicators of
empowerment that I sought to investigate with female clients. Thus my study does not
cover all of the material that I originally hoped to explore, but it does provide a
substantial base of data that I have utilized to analyze FINCA’s ability to empower its
female clients economically, psychologically, and socio-culturally.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS
The following data analysis is based on an aggregation of survey data from 151 of
the 170 interviews that I conducted with FINCA Honduras clients in June and July
2009—the interviews of those 151 clients who were women. The twenty-seven questions
of the FCAT survey and their respective elaborations have yielded specific indicators on
the economic, psychological, and socio-cultural empowerment (or lack thereof) of the
clients interviewed. Survey questions on general client information such as education
level and civil status have allowed me to analyze other possible sources aside from credit
with FINCA of positive or negative factors in clients’ lives. I will present the results of
the survey data for these 151 interviews by category of empowerment: economic,
psychological and socio-cultural. This data has been analyzed for correlations, means,
and for equality of means by ANOVA test. I will also present a number of qualitative and
descriptive comments from interviewees to provide extra detail to the statistical survey
results. As I review the results of the survey and their implications, I will highlight my
original hypotheses on specific indicators and the importance of their success or failure.

FINCA and Economic Empowerment
The indicators of economic empowerment that emerge from this FCAT survey
data are divided into five categories: family expenses, food security, health, education of
children, and financial satisfaction with FINCA. I have formed these categories based on
specific questions or groups of questions within the survey that address the economic
empowerment of clients. Each question has been analyzed for a correlation with the
client’s time with FINCA Honduras, for comparisons of response percentages between
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“new”, “middle”, and “old” clients, and/or for equality of response means between
“new”, “middle”, and “old” clients. (“New” clients have spent less than one year with the
organization, “middle” clients have spent one to four years with FINCA, and “old”
clients have spent four or more years with FINCA.) A correlation between two variables
shows a relationship or lack thereof between the two variables. In this case, if the variable
of client time with FINCA shows a positive correlation with a certain variable such as
client health, I claim that FINCA has demonstrated a positive impact on clients in that
area over time. In order for a correlation to be significant, its significance value must be
less than or equal to 0.05. Basic comparisons of response percentages between new,
middle, and old clients are used for categorical variables—those variables whose
responses cannot be analyzed through numerical means. ANOVA tests for equality of
means are used for continual variables—the ANOVA demonstrates whether the response
means between new, middle, and old clients show a significant difference and thus if they
show improvement or deterioration over time. All of these analyses are intended to
indicate if receiving microloans from FINCA has improved clients’ lives economically
over time. These time analyses have been my primary measurement of FINCA’s success
in empowering its clients. Before administering the survey, I originally hypothesized that
clients who had been with FINCA for more time would show increased spending on
family expenses, improved food security and health, increased frequency of children in
school, and higher satisfaction with the organization.
Our first indicator of economic empowerment is the category of family expenses.
Family expenses as measured by this survey are not a perfect measure of client economic
well-being or empowerment over time: first, the survey only covers seven categories that
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clients spend money on, and thus may leave out important areas of spending in clients’
lives. Second, because this survey does not have a control group, we cannot claim with
certainty that any differences in economic well-being between new and old clients are
due to FINCA’s impact. Finally, our analysis of these family expenses variables simply
compares new, middle, and old clients instead of measuring the expenses of the same
clients over time. Thus we cannot claim with certainty that differences between these
client categories show “improvement over time”, because the same clients are not being
measured. These second and third limitations will also apply to all of our subsequent
variables for economic, psychological, and socio-cultural empowerment.
Economic empowerment as indicated by family expenses has been measured by
seven FCAT survey questions on specific expenses of the client’s family: weekly food
expenses, weekly transportation expenses, monthly utility expenses, monthly phone
expenses, yearly home maintenance expenses, yearly clothing expenses, and yearly
education expenses. Most relevant is an eighth indicator that I calculated on client family
expenses, by combining these seven indicators to arrive at the value of a family’s daily
expenses per capita. (We could also state that this indicator measures “how much money
the client lives on per day”.) This one value, correlated with a client’s number of loan
cycles with FINCA (a basic indicator of her time with the organization), can demonstrate
if clients have been able to spend more money on family standard of living as a result of
the support of their FINCA loans. Increased standard of living in the client’s family, if
found among these female FINCA Honduras clients, could demonstrate one facet of
economic empowerment as discussed by microfinance theorists. Figure 1 presents this
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correlation along with each specific family expense indicator as correlated with the
client’s time with FINCA.
FIGURE 1- Correlations: Time with FINCA and Family expenses
Number of loan cycles with FINCA
Number of loan cycles Pearson Correlation
with FINCA

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

151.000

Weekly food expenses Pearson Correlation

.025

Sig. (2-tailed)

.763

N

149

Weekly transportation

Pearson Correlation

.032

expenses

Sig. (2-tailed)

.692

N

151

Pearson Correlation

expenses

Sig. (2-tailed)

.001

N

149

Monthly phone/

Pearson Correlation

.050

communication

Sig. (2-tailed)

.546

N

150

expenses
Yearly home

.260

**

Monthly utility

Pearson Correlation

-.036

maintenance expenses Sig. (2-tailed)

.659

N

150

Yearly clothing

Pearson Correlation

-.111

expenses

Sig. (2-tailed)

.190

N

142

Yearly education

Pearson Correlation

expenses

Sig. (2-tailed)

.433

N

142

Daily family per capita

Pearson Correlation

.009

expenses in dollars

Sig. (2-tailed)

.923

N

125

!

-.066
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Figure 1 presents our relevant findings on FINCA’s effects on client family expenses.
Contrary to my hypothesis, daily family per capita expenses and the client’s number of
loan cycles with FINCA show no correlation—in fact, the correlation is so insignificant
that its significance value is .923. None of the other individual expenses show significant
correlations with client time with FINCA aside from monthly utility expenses, whose
significance on its own means very little to our study. Clearly, credit with FINCA did not
help these female clients of FINCA Honduras to improve their ability to invest in their
family’s standard of living.
Interestingly, a second analysis for correlations between the client’s education
level and her family’s daily per capita expenses showed notable results: those clients who
had achieved higher education reported higher daily expenses per capita in their families.
The value for daily family per capita expenses has been converted into American dollars
for better common understanding of a family’s living standards. Figure 2 shows a threeway analysis between the variables of educational level, time with FINCA, and daily per
capita expenses. Daily per capita expenses is analyzed as a dependent variable of the
other two variables. As we examine the total means (in bold) for each level of education
reached by these female clients, we can observe a general trend of improvement in daily
family per capita expenses as level of education rises. (The outlier values for “no
schooling” and “secondary school incomplete” can be considered relatively negligible
because the number of interviewees reporting in these two categories was very small (9
women and 2 women, respectively).) Thus we can claim that the amount of money that a
client’s family lives on per day depends on her education level.
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When we examine the smaller differences between new, middle, and old clients in
Figure 2, we find that FINCA does not empower its clients to improve their daily family
per capita expenses over time in the context of client education level. I originally
hypothesized that those clients within the higher education levels would show more
marked increases in per capita expenses—that FINCA’s ability to economically empower
its female clients through this indicator of daily family per capita expenses would be
stronger for those clients who already possessed a high education level. However, only
the categories of “primary school incomplete” and “secondary school complete”
demonstrate steady increases in per capita expenses from new to middle to old clients.
All other categories show no clear positive or negative progression of response means to
this question on daily family per capita expenses, and thus no significance exists for a
relationship between time with FINCA and improved family expenses over time within
the context of client education level.
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FIGURE 2- Comparison: Per Capita in Dollars, Education, Time with FINCA
Per capita in dollars
New/old
with
Level of education reached

FINCA

No schooling

New

2.7024

2

1.43676

Middle

3.9177

5

5.52293

Old

2.3656

2

1.65464

Total

3.3027

9

4.04940

New

1.2608

15

.55289

Middle

2.1670

19

2.16618

Old

2.5430

12

1.62692

Total

1.9696

46

1.70019

New

2.6931

13

2.77574

Middle

2.4188

21

1.32346

Old

2.3563

10

.87097

Total

2.4857

44

1.77276

Secondary school

New

4.8091

1

.

incomplete

Middle

3.0063

1

.

Total

3.9077

2

1.27482

New

2.1579

8

1.15577

Middle

2.1818

5

.86087

Old

4.7511

3

2.30818

Total

2.6516

16

1.61755

New

3.2586

2

1.63979

Middle

6.8019

3

1.69563

Old

3.3385

3

1.89708

Total

4.6173

8

2.34682

New

2.1443

41

1.84847

Middle

2.7014

54

2.44411

Old

2.7693

30

1.57496

Total

2.5350

125

2.07639

Primary school incomplete

Primary school complete

Secondary school complete

Vocational school

Total
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Mean

N

Std. Deviation
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The above improvements in spending on family standard of living, dependent on the
client’s education level rather than on client time with FINCA, further demonstrate the
insignificance of FINCA’s empowerment impact on its female clients in this area. Taking
out microloans with FINCA has made little significant difference in these women’s
ability to meet important expenses for their family’s well being. Instead, it is their
education level that has seemingly predetermined the amount of money on which their
families live per day. Thus the power of basic societal realities—such as the fact that
better educated people possess higher capacity to earn and spend money—are not so
easily changeable in Honduras by this new and popular poverty-fighting strategy of
microfinance. Despite the rhetoric of social change and empowerment for women behind
microfinance, it is clear that empowering women to rise above the constraints of their
education levels is more difficult than it may seem.
The next indicator of economic empowerment that we turn to is food security.
The results for this indicator are based on responses to the question, “Which of the
following options best describes the food bought and consumed in your home in the past
year?” and to an elaborative question that I administered, which asked whether the
client’s food security had changed since the start of her loans with FINCA. The following
figures present general response percentages for these questions:
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FIGURE 3- Food security frequencies
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

We always eat what we want

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

62

41.1

41.3

41.3

67

44.4

44.7

86.0

16

10.6

10.7

96.7

5

3.3

3.3

100.0

150

99.3

100.0

1

.7

151

100.0

We have food but not always
the kinds of food that we
would like
Sometimes we don't have
enough food
We often don't have enough
food
Total
Missing

System

Total

FIGURE 4- Frequencies: Change in food security
Frequency
Valid

Cumulative Percent

67

44.4

44.7

44.7

Yes, negative change

4

2.6

2.7

47.3

79

52.3

52.7

100.0

150

99.3

100.0

1

.7

151

100.0

Total

Total

Valid Percent

Yes, positive change

No change

Missing

Percent

System

Although the plurality of clients gave the response “we have food but not always the
kinds that we would like”, the margin between the first and second response for this
question is insignificant. The vast majority of female FINCA Honduras clients thus have
good or excellent food security within their families. Even more relevant is the finding
that the majority of clients (52.7%) did not see any change in their family’s food security
as a result of their loans with FINCA, while a large percentage (44.7%) reported a
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positive change in food security and a negligible percentage of clients saw a negative
change. These findings are generally positive for this indicator. Those clients who saw a
positive change in their food security, although not the technical majority, constitute a
significant percentage of respondents. Specific client responses attest to FINCA’s impact
on client food security—many report not only a greater quantity of food eaten by their
families but better quality and variation of food. For example, Carla Suyapa Perez states
that “We eat better now in my family: before, it was rare for us to eat meat. Now we have
it often, and we also don’t have to eat the same exact things every day.”1d However,
positive changes were not clearly seen in a comparison between new and old clients for
our original food security question.
In Figure 5 we can observe a negligible difference between the response
percentages of old, middle, and new clients to the food security question. From this
comparison of response percentages we may conclude that the food security of a client’s
family does not significantly improve with her time as a FINCA client. However, the
comparison shown in Figure 6 between new, middle, and old clients for our question on
changes in food security presents positive results:

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
d

!

All client names have been changed for confidentiality purposes.
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FIGURE 5- Food security and time with FINCA
Cumulative
New/old with FINCA
New

Valid

We always eat what we want

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

19

40.4

40.4

40.4

23

48.9

48.9

89.4

5

10.6

10.6

100.0

Total

47

100.0

100.0

We always eat what we want

24

35.3

35.3

35.3

31

45.6

45.6

80.9

8

11.8

11.8

92.6

5

7.4

7.4

100.0

Total

68

100.0

100.0

We always eat what we want

19

54.3

54.3

54.3

13

37.1

37.1

91.4

3

8.6

8.6

100.0

35

100.0

100.0

We have food but not always
the kinds of food that we
would like
Sometimes we don't have
enough food

Middle

Valid

We have food but not always
the kinds of food that we
would like
Sometimes we don't have
enough food
We often don't have enough
food

Old

Valid

We have food but not always
the kinds of food that we
would like
Sometimes we don't have
enough food
Total
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FIGURE 6- Food security change and time with FINCA
Cumulative
New/old with FINCA
New

Middle

Old

Valid

Valid

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Yes, positive change

13

27.7

27.7

27.7

Yes, negative change

2

4.3

4.3

31.9

No change

32

68.1

68.1

100.0

Total

47

100.0

100.0

Yes, positive change

35

51.5

51.5

51.5

Yes, negative change

2

2.9

2.9

54.4

No change

31

45.6

45.6

100.0

Total

68

100.0

100.0

Yes, positive change

19

54.3

54.3

54.3

No change

16

45.7

45.7

100.0

Total

35

100.0

100.0

As seen in Figure 6, only a small percentage of clients who have been with
FINCA for less than a year report a positive change in their food security (27.7%).
However, middle and old clients show a clear improvement—the majority of clients in
these categories have seen a positive change in their food security. Thus, the longer a
client has been with FINCA, the more likely she is to have seen an improvement in her
food security. We can even claim that the above analysis is the most significant
measurement of client empowerment for this indicator of food security, because this
question explicitly asks the client if she has seen a positive change in her life due to
FINCA’s help. From this comparison of percentages and the generally positive responses
for our two questions on food security, we can claim that these female FINCA clients
have been economically empowered by the organization through the improvement of
their food security.
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The third indicator of economic empowerment tested by this survey is client
health. This indicator is based on two questions: “How would you rate your health at this
time?”, and my elaborative question, “Has your health or the health of your family
changed since the start of your loans with FINCA?” For the first question, clients were
asked to rate their health from 1 to 5, with the number 1 as “excellent” health and the
number 5 as “very poor” health. The mean of responses to this question was 2.59,
demonstrating that the health of most interviewees lies between “good” and “fair”.
Before administering the survey, I originally hypothesized that a clear difference would
emerge over time in the health of FINCA clients and their families. However, the
following time analyses demonstrate a lack of significance in the relationship between
client health and time with the organization and may suggest no empowerment for female
FINCA clients in this area. As seen in Figure 7, the two-tailed measurement of
significance for the correlation between client health and time with FINCA shows no
significance: its value is .374, while only a .05 value or less would demonstrate a
significant relationship between the two variables and the dependence of client health on
time with the organization.
FIGURE 7- Correlations: Health and Time with FINCA

Number of loan cycles with
FINCA

Pearson Correlation

Number of loan

How would you

cycles with

rate your health

FINCA

at this time?

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.374
151.000

151
1.000

How would you rate your

Pearson Correlation

.073

health at this time?

Sig. (2-tailed)

.374

N

151

!

.073

151.000
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The following ANOVA analysis for equality of means, as seen in Figures 8 and 9, also
suggests that there exists no relationship between time as a FINCA client and client
health. The mean responses for this question show almost no variance between new,
middle, and old clients (from 2.51 to 2.66), and the ANOVA test for significance between
these means shows a value very far from the .05 significance benchmark: .687. This test
therefore proves the relative equality of client responses between new, middle, and old
clients and suggests a lack of improvement in health over time for female FINCA clients.
FIGURE 8- Health and Equality of Means for time with FINCA
How would you rate your health at this
time?
95% Confidence Interval for
Mean
N

Mean

Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum

New

47

2.51

.930

.136

2.24

2.78

1

4

Middle

68

2.66

1.045

.127

2.41

2.91

1

5

Old

35

2.66

.906

.153

2.35

2.97

1

5

150

2.61

.975

.080

2.46

2.77

1

5

Total

FIGURE 9- Health and ANOVA significance for time with FINCA
How would you rate your health at this time?
Sum of Squares
Between Groups

df

Mean Square

.722

2

.361

Within Groups

140.851

147

.958

Total

141.573

149

F

Sig.
.377

.687

Our second question on health, which asked clients if the health of their families
had changed since the start of their loans with FINCA, demonstrates more positive results
as an indicator of economic empowerment:
!
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FIGURE 10- Frequencies: Change in Family Health
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Yes, positive change

72

47.7

47.7

47.7

Yes, negative change

3

2.0

2.0

49.7

76

50.3

50.3

100.0

151

100.0

100.0

No change
Total

As the response percentages in Figure 10 demonstrate, many female clients of FINCA
have shown signs of empowerment by the organization through improvement of their
health. Although the statistical majority of interviewees reported no change at all in their
health since they had become FINCA clients, a substantial percentage (47.7%) of clients
reported a positive change in their health or the health of their families. The details
provided by interviewees in response to this question on changes in their health were also
overwhelmingly positive. Blanca Emilia Cruz Jiménez reports that “I use part of my
loans to take my mother to the doctor when she needs it, and to buy her medicines. We
almost never get sick, with FINCA’s help.”2 Olga Maribel Carrasco explains that “Since I
started with FINCA, my foot problems have gotten better. Before, to make my living I
had to walk all day selling my products. Now I can hold my business in my home—I
have better health, and I can take care of my children.”3 Again we can claim that
responses to this question are most relevant in measuring FINCA’s empowerment impact
on the client, because the question asks the interviewee directly about changes in her
health due to FINCA’s help. The fact that close to half of all interviewees report a
positive impact on their health speaks well for FINCA’s general ability to empower its
female clients, despite the lack of significant improvement in client responses to this
question from new to old clients:
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FIGURE 11- Change in family health and time with FINCA
Cumulative
New/old with FINCA
New

Middle

Old

Valid

Valid

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Yes, positive change

19

40.4

40.4

40.4

No change

28

59.6

59.6

100.0

Total

47

100.0

100.0

Yes, positive change

37

54.4

54.4

54.4

Yes, negative change

2

2.9

2.9

57.4

No change

29

42.6

42.6

100.0

Total

68

100.0

100.0

Yes, positive change

15

42.9

42.9

42.9

Yes, negative change

1

2.9

2.9

45.7

No change

19

54.3

54.3

100.0

Total

35

100.0

100.0

The general equality of responses between new, middle, and old clients shown in Figure
11 may simply demonstrate that approximately half of female clients have been
economically empowered by FINCA through the improvement of their health, although
this empowerment has no relationship with client time with the organization. These
results, in combination with the lack of significant relationships found earlier between
client time with FINCA and client health, present us with a mixed perspective on client
health as an indicator of economic empowerment. We can claim that although many
female FINCA clients have seen marked improvements in their health, FINCA still has
significant progress to make in order to consistently empower its female clients in this
area of health.
Our fourth indicator of economic empowerment is education of the client’s
children. Two questions on education were administered in the FCAT survey, one that
asked how many school-aged children lived in the client’s household, and a subsequent
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question that asked how many of those children attended school. What the FCAT survey
lacks in this area of child education is a question that asks for the level of education
reached by children of clients or for the amount of schooling that the client plans for her
children to reach. Questions such as these would measure more clearly the impact of a
client’s membership with FINCA on her children’s level of education and thus on the
economic empowerment of the client’s family through this indicator of schooling.
However, using the given survey, I hypothesized that over time FINCA clients would
send more of their children to school. However, the following comparison of new,
middle, and old client responses through ANOVA test for equality of means disproves
my hypothesis:

FIGURE 12- Child education and Equality of Means for time with FINCA
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean

N
How many school- New

Mean

Std.

Std.

Lower

Upper

Deviation

Error

Bound

Bound

Minimum Maximum

47

2.06

1.451

.212

1.64

2.49

0

6

Middle

68

2.16

1.681

.204

1.75

2.57

0

8

Old

35

1.63

1.457

.246

1.13

2.13

0

6

Total

150

2.01

1.565

.128

1.75

2.26

0

8

How many of these New

47

1.96

1.382

.202

1.55

2.36

0

6

children attend

Middle

68

1.93

1.765

.214

1.50

2.35

0

8

Old

35

1.43

1.335

.226

.97

1.89

0

6

150

1.82

1.563

.128

1.57

2.07

0

8

aged children live
in your home?

school?

Total
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FIGURE 13- Child education and ANOVA significance for time with FINCA
Sum of
Squares
How many school-aged
children live in your

Between Groups

df

Mean Square

6.793

2

3.396

Within Groups

358.201

147

2.437

Total

364.993

149

7.021

2

3.511
2.429

F

Sig.

1.394

.251

1.445

.239

home?
How many of these

Between Groups

children attend school?

Within Groups

357.119

147

Total

364.140

149

As seen above under “means” in Figure 12, new, middle, and old clients all have
approximately two children and send both of those two children to school. There is thus
no significance in the difference between these nearly identical responses, as
demonstrated by our ANOVA test for significant equality of means—the values .251 and
.239 do not reach the significance value of .05. We cannot gain any information or
analysis from this data. We cannot say that the education level of clients’ children has
improved, nor that it has not improved—it seems to have always been essentially ideal, as
all children in clients’ households are attending school. Of course, this ideal frequency of
education is not a reality in Honduras. These two questions seem simply to fail to capture
an accurate and detailed picture of the education of the children of FINCA clients—its
frequency, its quality, and the level of education reached by the child. For this fourth
indicator of economic empowerment through the education of children, we can therefore
make no statement on the empowerment or lack thereof of FINCA’s female clients.
The final indicator of economic empowerment as measured by this survey is
satisfaction with FINCA’s policies with regards to loan amount, loan cycle, and interest
rate. It is based on questions on the client’s current loan amount, loan cycle length, and
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interest rate, and their subsequent opinion on those numbers. Client satisfaction with
FINCA is also not an ideal indicator of the economic empowerment of these female
clients because it simply alludes to the interviewee’s ability to manage her business and
her finances. There exist no specific questions in this FCAT survey that address the
success of the client’s business or her financial comfort and progress. I recognize these
limitations, and through my analysis of this indicator I find mixed results for economic
empowerment, as client opinion is generally very positive on loan amount, loan cycle,
and interest rate, but seems to worsen over time. These opinions are based on an average
loan amount of 8825.33 lempiras ($490.30), an average loan cycle of 6.08 months, and an
average interest rate of 2.9 percent. Figures 14-16 demonstrate a high satisfaction with
FINCA’s policies, as over 60 percent of clients report loan amount, loan cycle, and
interest rate as “just right.”

FIGURE 14- Loan amount ratings frequencies
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Too big

Total

!

Valid Percent

Percent

3

2.0

2.0

2.0

Just right

97

64.2

64.7

66.7

Too small

50

33.1

33.3

100.0

150

99.3

100.0

1

.7

151

100.0

Total
Missing

Percent

System

76

FIGURE 15- Loan cycle length ratings frequencies
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Valid Percent

Percent

Too long

6

4.0

4.0

4.0

Just right

103

68.2

68.7

72.7

Too short

41

27.2

27.3

100.0

150

99.3

100.0

1

.7

151

100.0

Total
Missing

Percent

System

Total

FIGURE 16- Interest rate ratings frequencies
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Total

Valid Percent

Percent

Too high

51

33.8

34.0

34.0

Just right

98

64.9

65.3

99.3

Too low

1

.7

.7

100.0

150

99.3

100.0

1

.7

151

100.0

Total
Missing

Percent

System

These high satisfaction rates suggest that FINCA empowers its female clients by
providing them with supportive and effective financial services that enable them to grow
their small businesses and improve their savings efficiently. However, the following
comparisons in opinion between client categories present other conclusions.
When we compare the responses of new, middle and old clients for these opinion
questions, a difference emerges between the views of the three groups—middle and old
clients express a worse opinion of loan cycle and interest rate than new clients. Initial
comparisons in values for loan amount, loan cycle, and interest rate between new,
middle, and old clients is relevant to this analysis:
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FIGURE 17- Loan opinions and Equality of Means for time with FINCA
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean

N
What is the
amount of your
current loan? (in
lempiras)?

Mean

Std.

Std.

Lower

Upper

Deviation

Error

Bound

Bound

Minimum Maximum

New

47 5329.79 3409.126 497.272

4328.83

6330.74

500

15000

Middle

68 8560.29 5378.763 652.271

7258.36

9862.23

2000

25000

Old

35 14034.29 15540.742 2626.865

8695.85 19372.72

1000

80000

150 8825.33 9053.615 739.225

7364.62 10286.05

500

80000

Total
What is the

New

47

5.17

1.090

.159

4.85

5.49

1

8

current length of

Middle

68

6.28

1.709

.207

5.87

6.69

4

10

Old

35

6.91

2.536

.429

6.04

7.79

4

14

Total

150

6.08

1.895

.155

5.77

6.39

1

14

What is the

New

26

.0296

.00147

.00029

.0290

.0302

.02

.03

interest rate of

Middle

49

.0294

.00199

.00028

.0289

.0300

.02

.03

Old

30

.0309

.00581

.00106

.0288

.0331

.02

.06

105

.0299

.00349

.00034

.0292

.0306

.02

.06

your loan cycle in
months?

your current loan?
(percentage)

Total

As Figure 17 demonstrates, client loan amount logically doubles over time from new to
old clients, as the client improves her business and revenue and is able to take out larger
loans. Meanwhile, loan cycle and interest rate stay generally constant. The following
comparison of responses for opinions demonstrates that both new and old clients are
satisfied with the amount of their loans despite the large discrepancy in value. However,
for relatively equal loan cycle length and interest rate, new and old clients show a
difference in opinion.
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FIGURE 18- Loan amount ratings and time with FINCA
Cumulative
New/old with FINCA
New

Middle

Old

Valid

Valid

Valid

Frequency

Too big

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

1

2.1

2.1

2.1

Just right

30

63.8

63.8

66.0

Too small

16

34.0

34.0

100.0

Total

47

100.0

100.0

2

2.9

2.9

2.9

Just right

44

64.7

64.7

67.6

Too small

22

32.4

32.4

100.0

Total

68

100.0

100.0

Just right

23

65.7

65.7

65.7

Too small

12

34.3

34.3

100.0

Total

35

100.0

100.0

Too big

FIGURE 19- Loan cycle length ratings and time with FINCA
Cumulative
New/old with FINCA
New

Valid

Old

Valid

Valid

Valid Percent

Percent

3

6.4

6.4

6.4

Just right

36

76.6

76.6

83.0

Too short

8

17.0

17.0

100.0

47

100.0

100.0

Too long

1

1.5

1.5

1.5

Just right

43

63.2

63.2

64.7

Too short

24

35.3

35.3

100.0

Total

68

100.0

100.0

Too long

2

5.7

5.7

5.7

Just right

24

68.6

68.6

74.3

Too short

9

25.7

25.7

100.0

35

100.0

100.0

Total

!

Percent

Too long

Total
Middle

Frequency
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FIGURE 20- Interest rate ratings and time with FINCA
Cumulative
New/old with FINCA
New

Middle

Old

Valid

Valid

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Too high

9

19.1

19.1

19.1

Just right

37

78.7

78.7

97.9

Too low

1

2.1

2.1

100.0

Total

47

100.0

100.0

Too high

30

44.1

44.1

44.1

Just right

38

55.9

55.9

100.0

Total

68

100.0

100.0

Too high

12

34.3

34.3

34.3

Just right

23

65.7

65.7

100.0

35

100.0

100.0

Total

Why are those respondents who have been FINCA clients for over a year less likely to
state that loan cycle and interest rate are “just right”? It seems that these clients may have
become more financially frustrated as a result of their loans with FINCA and have found
it more difficult to manage and return their loans as time goes on. Thus female clients of
FINCA Honduras have not been economically empowered as suggested by these
comparisons between new, middle, and old client opinions. But equally important is the
simple fact that within each client category, the majority of interviewees still reports that
loan amount, loan cycle length, and interest rate are “just right”. Our original analyses
show that over sixty percent of these interviewees are satisfied with FINCA’s financial
services. Therefore we cannot reach a concrete conclusion on FINCA’s ability to
economically empower its female clients through the providence of effective and
manageable microloans.
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A review of these five indicators of economic empowerment reveals a general
lack of consensus on the empowerment of female FINCA Honduras clients in terms of
improvements in family expenses, food security, health, education of children, or
satisfaction with FINCA. My original hypotheses, which predicted significant differences
in responses to these questions between new and old clients and significant correlations
between responses and client time with FINCA, were mostly incorrect. Only food
security as an indicator saw clear improvements in clients’ lives, and health also showed
relatively positive, although at times mixed, results. The sporadic nature of these results
may largely be due to the shortcomings of this FCAT survey. Indicators such as family
expenses and education of children showed significant flaws and limitations as valid
measures of economic empowerment. Other important indicators were not measured at
all by the survey, such as the female client’s financial independence or ability to
contribute to family income. We may claim, in fact, that the FCAT survey questions on
food security and on health were the only effective ones within this category of economic
empowerment, and thus that food security and health are our most valid indicators of the
economic empowerment of FINCA’s female clients. This perspective in turn gives our
results a more positive light. Now, we turn to the next form of possible empowerment for
women through microfinance: psychological empowerment.
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FINCA and Psychological Empowerment
The indicators of psychological empowerment measured by this FCAT survey
data fall into two categories: confidence and happiness. These categories are based on
specific questions or groups of questions within the survey that address clients’
confidence, changes in confidence over time, and general happiness with their lives. Each
question within this category of psychological empowerment has been analyzed either for
a correlation with the client’s time with FINCA Honduras or for equality of means
between new and old clients. I originally hypothesized that older clients would show
greater confidence and happiness in their responses to these questions. Results of my data
analysis have been mixed in this respect: certain percentages, comparisons and
correlations show evidence of psychological empowerment, while others do not.
Our first indicator of psychological empowerment as measured by the FCAT
survey is client confidence, based on two survey questions: “Do you feel capable and
confident to make important decisions that could change the course of your life?” and my
elaborative question, “Have you felt a change in this confidence since the start of your
loans with FINCA?” For the first question, clients could choose responses on a scale
from 1 to 4, with the number 1 as “totally capable”, 2 as “mostly capable”, 3 as “neither
capable or incapable”, and 4 as “mostly incapable”. The mean of responses was 1.38, and
70.9% of clients reported that they were “totally capable” and confident to make
important decisions that could change their lives. Another 19.9% percent responded that
they felt “mostly capable.” Client descriptions reflect this high level of confidence among
female FINCA clients. Rita Xiomara Portillo articulates that “I feel very capable to do
my work on my own. I am married but I am working with this FINCA loan all by myself
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and I don’t need anyone else to help me pay for it.”4 María Isabel Cruz López declares, “I
like to be prosperous, so I work very hard and I never feel useless. I’m a woman who
fights for what she wants and FINCA gives me the opportunity to always continue that
fight.”5 From these statements it is clear that whether FINCA has specifically impacted
their confidence or not, these women possess a positive sense of agency and self-worth.
Most importantly, my elaborative question also yielded positive results—the
majority of clients (51.7%) stated that they had seen a positive change in their confidence
since the start of their loans with FINCA, while 7.3% saw a negative change and 41.1%
reported no change in confidence. These analyses suggest the psychological
empowerment of FINCA’s female clients, as the vast majority demonstrates high levels
of confidence and the majority state that their confidence has improved since they began
working with FINCA. The following comparisons between new and old clients and
correlations between confidence and time with FINCA suggest otherwise:

FIGURE 21- Confidence and Equality of Means for time with FINCA
Do you feel capable and confident to make important decisions that could change the course of
your life?
95% Confidence Interval for
Mean
N

Mean

Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum

New

47

1.57

.878

.128

1.32

1.83

1

4

Middle

68

1.46

.871

.106

1.24

1.67

1

4

Old

35

1.23

.490

.083

1.06

1.40

1

3

150

1.44

.807

.066

1.31

1.57

1

4

Total
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FIGURE 22- Confidence and ANOVA significance for time with FINCA
Do you feel capable and confident to make important decisions that could change the course
of your life?
Sum of Squares
Between Groups

df

Mean Square

2.432

2

1.216

Within Groups

94.528

147

.643

Total

96.960

149

F

Sig.

1.891

.155

FIGURE 23- Correlations: Psychological factors and Time with FINCA
Do you feel capable
and confident to make
important decisions that

Number of loan cycles with
FINCA

Pearson Correlation

Number of loan cycles

could change the

with FINCA

course of your life?

1.000

-.107

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.189
151.000

151

As seen in Figure 22, no significance (a value of .155) was found in the difference
between new, middle and old clients’ mean responses to this question on confidence. It is
interesting to note that confidence in fact declines from new to old clients, although this
decline is not statistically significant. As well, Figure 23 shows that no significant
correlation (.189) was found between time as a FINCA client and client confidence. Thus
it seems from this data analysis that client confidence does not improve over time. A
comparison between new, middle, and old clients for our second elaborative question,
which asks explicitly if clients have felt a change in confidence, also shows no
improvement from new to old clients in positive responses. As seen in Figure 24,
between the three client categories the percentage of respondents who reported a positive
change in their confidence stays around 50%.
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FIGURE 24- Change in confidence and time with FINCA
Cumulative
New/old with FINCA
New

Middle

Old

Valid

Valid

Valid

Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Yes, positive change

25

53.2

53.2

53.2

No change

22

46.8

46.8

100.0

Total

47

100.0

100.0

Yes, positive change

36

52.9

52.9

52.9

Yes, negative change

7

10.3

10.3

63.2

No change

25

36.8

36.8

100.0

Total

68

100.0

100.0

Yes, positive change

17

48.6

48.6

48.6

Yes, negative change

4

11.4

11.4

60.0

No change

14

40.0

40.0

100.0

Total

35

100.0

100.0

More interesting here is the increase from new to old clients in reported deterioration of
confidence since the start of their loans with FINCA. Not a single interviewee who has
spent less than a year with the organization reports feeling damage to her confidence due
to working with FINCA. However, 11% of those who have been FINCA clients for over
four years report a negative change in their confidence since the start of their loans with
FINCA. These statistical differences suggest that FINCA’s initial impact on the female
client, if any, is always positive. It may even suggest that the new FINCA client feels
more optimistic in general about her capabilities to shape the future of her business and
her family. The long-term impact of FINCA’s services on women is slightly more mixed,
however, as about 10% of clients seem to lose confidence in themselves, possibly due to
stress from the organization’s high financial demands or discouragement at the failure of
a specific business venture. This percentage of unsatisfied clients is small, however. The
simple fact remains that 51.7% of women interviewed—the majority of respondents—
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have felt a positive change in their confidence due to FINCA’s services. This statistic
alone, because it is self-reported by the clients, outweighs any of our analyses and
comparisons between new, middle, and old clients in search for signs of improvement in
client confidence over time. Therefore we can state that confidence, as an indicator of
FINCA’s empowerment of its female clients, has yielded positive results.
The second indicator of psychological empowerment as measured by this survey,
client happiness, is based on the question “In general, how satisfied are you with your
life?” Clients were asked to place their response on a scale from 1 to 10, with the number
1 as “extremely unsatisfied” and the number 10 as “extremely satisfied”. The mean of
responses was 8.31, indicating high client happiness. However, because the FCAT survey
lacks a control group, we cannot deduce from this result that client happiness was
dependent on FINCA’s services, or that happiness was caused or improved by the client
working with FINCA. Just as we could not attribute the highly positive client confidence
ratings to FINCA’s support without also reporting the results to an elaborative question
on change in confidence, we now must turn to a data analysis of improved happiness over
time in order to analyze FINCA’s true effect on the client’s happiness. The following
comparisons between new, middle and old clients and correlations between happiness
and time with FINCA suggest a negligible empowerment impact on female clients for the
psychological indicator of happiness:
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FIGURE 25- Happiness and Equality of Means for time with FINCA
In general, how satisfied are you with your
life?
95% Confidence Interval for
Mean
N

Mean

Std. Deviation Std. Error Lower Bound Upper Bound Minimum Maximum

New

47

8.15

1.888

.275

7.59

8.70

4

10

Middle

68

8.21

1.959

.238

7.73

8.68

1

10

Old

35

8.69

2.111

.357

7.96

9.41

1

10

150

8.30

1.972

.161

7.98

8.62

1

10

Total

FIGURE 26- Happiness and ANOVA significance for time with FINCA
In general, how satisfied are you with your life?
Sum of Squares
Between Groups

df

Mean Square

6.882

2

3.441

Within Groups

572.618

147

3.895

Total

579.500

149

F

Sig.
.883

.416

FIGURE 27- Correlations: Psychological factors and Time with FINCA

Number of loan cycles with
FINCA

Pearson Correlation

Number of loan

In general, how

cycles with

satisfied are you

FINCA

with your life?

1.000

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

.147
.072

151.000

151

We see above in Figure 25 that there is only the smallest difference between new, middle,
and old client satisfaction with life. On a scale from 1 to 10, all three groups of clients
reported approximately “8” as the number to measure their general happiness. The
ANOVA test for significant equality of means, shown in Figure 26, yields no significance
whatsoever (.416). As well, the relationship shown in Figure 27 between time with

!

87

FINCA and happiness approaches significance at .072 but does not reach the benchmark
of .05 to demonstrate a significant correlation. These data analyses demonstrate no clear
impact of FINCA’s support on client happiness. Interviewees report very high happiness
in general (an average of 8.31), but as discussed, we cannot attribute this happiness to
FINCA’s help without the use of a control group. This inability to connect client
responses with FINCA’s help may have been balanced by a specific question on any
changes in the client’s happiness since she had begun her loans with FINCA. I made the
research error of overlooking the importance of such a question in my administration of
the FCAT survey. Therefore, as measured by this second indicator of client happiness,
female FINCA clients have not experienced any statistically proven psychological
empowerment.
Our analysis of these two indicators of psychological empowerment, client
confidence and client happiness, have yielded mixed results. Most significantly, findings
showed that the majority of female clients interviewed for this survey reported feeling an
increase in their confidence since they began as clients with FINCA. With this data we
could make the argument that female FINCA clients have indeed been psychologically
empowered. A glimpse of optimism thus reveals itself in this investigation of
psychological indicators of empowerment. Our second indicator of psychological
empowerment, happiness, demonstrates that female FINCA clients have a generally high
level of satisfaction with their lives. Our statistics show no significance, however, in
measuring FINCA’s role in creating or improving this client happiness. The results of this
data analysis for psychological empowerment have proved more positive than those for
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economic empowerment, but it still remains open for debate whether these female
FINCA Honduras clients are being psychologically empowered by the organization.

FINCA and Socio-cultural Empowerment
The final form of female empowerment arguably made possible by microfinance
organizations is socio-cultural empowerment. FINCA’s standardized FCAT survey
administered one question on household roles that can be used to measure socio-cultural
empowerment: “Are you the head of the household?” Answers to this question can be
used to analyze gender roles within marital relationships and families in general. In the
Spanish version of this question, the connotation of the phrase “head of the household”
specifically refers to holding the directive role in the family. A substantial shortcoming of
this FCAT survey is the lack of additional questions that could be used as indicators of
the socio-cultural empowerment of female clients. More effective questions in this
category may have asked the female client about her relationship with her husband or
other male members of the family and her specific responsibilities in the household, or
about her role as a woman in the community. Although I could not specifically
administer such questions, I was able to capture details on these indicators from certain
clients by recording their elaborative comments, which I will also review in this section.
Before administering this FCAT survey, I hypothesized that those women who
had been with FINCA for more time would be more likely to be the heads of their
households. General percentages of responses do show positive results for this question,
but responses show no clear improvement from new to old clients and are significantly
affected by the outside variable of civil status. As seen in Figure 28, the majority of
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female clients reported that they were the heads of their households. In Figure 29’s
comparison between new and old clients, no clear trend of improvement or deterioration
is seen in the percentage of clients who are the heads of their households:
FIGURE 28- Head of household frequencies
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Valid Percent

Percent

Yes

79

52.3

53.0

53.0

No

70

46.4

47.0

100.0

149

98.7

100.0

2

1.3

151

100.0

Total
Missing

Percent

System

Total

FIGURE 29- Head of household and time with FINCA
Cumulative
New/old with FINCA
New

Valid

Missing

Frequency

Valid

Missing

!

Valid

Percent

22

46.8

47.8

47.8

No

24

51.1

52.2

100.0

Total

46

97.9

100.0

1

2.1

47

100.0

Yes

39

57.4

58.2

58.2

No

28

41.2

41.8

100.0

Total

67

98.5

100.0

1

1.5

68

100.0

Yes

17

48.6

48.6

48.6

No

18

51.4

51.4

100.0

Total

35

100.0

100.0

System

System

Total
Old

Valid Percent

Yes

Total
Middle

Percent
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It seems from the above analyses that female clients who have spent many years with
FINCA Honduras are no more likely to be the heads of their households than those who
have just began as FINCA clients. But it is much more crucial to examine the salient
variable of civil status in relationship with responses to this question—any single mother
is the head of her household by default, and not by empowerment through the
improvement of gender roles within her marriage. The strong effect of civil status on
whether a female client runs her household is displayed in Figure 30:
FIGURE 30- Crosstabulation: Head of household, time with FINCA, and civil status
New/old with FINCA
Civil status
Single

New
Are you the head of

Yes

the household?

Count
% within New/old
with FINCA

No

Count
% within New/old

Total Count
% within New/old
Married

Are you the head of

Yes

the household?

Count
% within New/old

No

Count
% within New/old

Total Count
% within New/old
Open union (union

Are you the head of

libre)

the household?

Yes

Count
% within New/old

No

Count
% within New/old

Total Count
% within New/old

!

Middle

Old

Total

11

16

7

34

73.3%

88.9%

63.6%

77.3%

4

2

4

10

26.7%

11.1%

36.4%

22.7%

15

18

11

44

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
4

7

7

18

33.3%

29.2%

46.7%

35.3%

8

17

8

33

66.7%

70.8%

53.3%

64.7%

12

24

15

51

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
7

16

3

26

36.8%

64.0%

33.3%

49.1%

12

9

6

27

63.2%

36.0%

66.7%

50.9%

19

25

9

53

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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The total response percentages shown in bold above for the categories of single,
married, and open union clients reveal that the vast majority (77.3%) of single female
clients are also the heads of their households. (The 22.7% of these single women who are
not the heads of their households generally live with fathers, mothers, or grown sons who
assume the household head role.) When we examine responses given by married clients,
we find very different percentages—only 35.3% of married female clients reported that
they were the heads of their households. This clear difference suggests that a married
Honduran woman, even if she is a microfinance client, remains likely to hold a secondary
role to her husband in the home. Interestingly, those clients in open unions with a lifelong
partner instead of in a formal marriage showed an almost equal split between “yes” and
“no” responses to this question. This discrepancy between married clients and those in
open unions suggests that the flexibility of an open union could encourage Honduran men
to provide more voice and influence to their wives than the rigidity of a marriage, which
may give men the comfort to treat their wives with more forceful authority.
Notwithstanding, the most significant difference that we see in this analysis of civil status
and head of household responses lies between single and married clients. Married clients
are unlikely to be the heads of their households—but are they more likely over time with
FINCA to assume this role? To analyze FINCA’s possible empowerment impact on a
client’s family role within the context of her civil status, we observe the response
percentages for new, middle, and old clients within these civil status categories.
Not surprisingly, single female clients show no significant increase or decrease in
their likelihood to be the heads of their households over time. The clear majority of these
women are already in charge of their families by default, and thus FINCA has little effect
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on their roles within the home. For married clients we see a small increase in the
likelihood that the client will be the head of her household—from 33.3% for new clients
to 46.7% for old clients. However, this positive trend is too small to be considered truly
significant in terms of measuring FINCA’s empowerment impact on these female clients
and the gender roles in their homes. Clients in open unions also demonstrate no clear
trend in their likelihood to be the heads of their households between new, middle, and old
clients. Upon examination of new, middle, and old female client responses to this
question within the context of civil status, we find no significant relationship between
FINCA’s services and the woman’s role in the home. Whether a female FINCA client is
the head of her household depends much more on her civil status than on her time with
the organization. Thus we have found no evidence of socio-cultural empowerment for the
female clients of FINCA Honduras in this survey.
The elaborative comments made by female interviewees on this question about
household roles also yielded important insights on the continuation of powerful gender
norms in Honduran society, despite any efforts of microfinance organizations or other
NGOs to socio-culturally empower women. Among those interviewees who were married
or in open unions, multiple women expressed an internalization of gender norms and
skewed power relations within their marital relationships, and readily accepted the
superiority of their husbands in the home. For example, Natalia García states, “My
husband is the head of the household because he is the man in the relationship! A woman
always has to ask permission of her husband—I can’t say ‘I’m going to do this or that’
without talking to my husband first.”6 Financial differences between husband and wife
also frequently impacted the same gender imbalance of familial roles. Paola Maylen
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Ordóñez Rivera reports, “My husband is the head of the household and I’m a help to him.
He has steady work in construction and makes more money than I do, and for that reason
he has the responsibility.”7
Whether for socially normative or financial power differences, the vast majority
of women in long-term matrimonial or open union relationships expressed a clear power
difference within their homes between husband and wife. These women had generally
come to accept the gender discrepancy in family roles, and as traditional “amas de casa”
(housewives), to take on all housework regardless of increased or changing
responsibilities in their businesses as a result of their loans with FINCA. Valentina
Espinosa Díaz explains that, although she has seen an increase in her business’ success
and thus in her daily workload since she began her loans, her household chores have not
decreased. She declares, “I run my convenient store all day, but I also continue doing all
the housework—clothes, food, childcare… everything.”8 These client testimonies support
our survey results above, which demonstrate a complete lack of impact of FINCA’s
services on the female client’s role in her home. Through our survey data and interviewee
descriptions, the permanence of cultural gender norms in Honduras becomes clear. Deepset cultural beliefs are difficult to change and their transformation often takes a process of
many years—a process that no one non-profit organization can catalyze on its own.
Therefore it is not surprising that FINCA Honduras has not succeeded in socio-culturally
empowering its female clients as measured by our FCAT survey.
From this FCAT survey administered in June and July 2009 with female clients of
FINCA Honduras, we have found mixed results in terms of the empowerment of women
through microfinance. Our five indicators of economic empowerment as measured by this
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survey—family expenses, food security, health, child education, and financial satisfaction
with FINCA—demonstrated certain positive changes in the lives of female clients as well
as a lack of impact in other areas. The food security and health of interviewees showed
the clearest positive change due to the help of FINCA’s services. Our indicators of
psychological empowerment presented the best results in terms of empowerment—a clear
improvement in confidence was seen among the female clients interviewed, and client
happiness was high (despite our inability to specifically attribute that happiness to
FINCA’s help). Finally, our indicator of socio-cultural empowerment, household roles,
and related elaborations by interviewees on gender relations in the home clearly
demonstrated FINCA’s lack of impact on female clients in this area. No clear change was
seen in women’s marital relations or roles in the household due to the client’s
membership with FINCA. In my final chapter, I will now address the possible
explanations for these results in terms of the economic, psychological, and socio-cultural
empowerment of FINCA’s female clients, and offer my current perspectives on the
microfinance industry within this context.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
Microfinance has been promoted worldwide as a tool for the alleviation of
poverty and the empowerment of women. In light of my study with the female clients of
FINCA Honduras, I question the ability of microfinance to achieve these aims for
impoverished women. Microfinance organizations do not always succeed in the
economic, psychological, and socio-cultural empowerment of their female clients. The
151 female FINCA Honduras clients interviewed in our survey have experienced partial
improvements in their standard of living and clear improvements in their level of selfconfidence, but have seen no change in gender norms and power imbalances within their
homes since they began the FINCA program. The empowerment impact of FINCA’s
services on their lives has thus been limited. It is encouraging, however, that the female
clients of FINCA Honduras have generally not demonstrated any of the negative impacts
on their lives that have been found in some studies on women and microfinance, such as
debilitating debt or increased domestic violence among partners. FINCA Honduras has
proved itself a supportive and efficient institution in serving its clients, but does not
currently have the capacity to fully empower its female clients through economic,
psychological, and socio-cultural changes in their lives.
My investigation of the economic empowerment of female FINCA Honduras
clients suggests that FINCA actively improves the standard of living of Honduran women
within the bounds of their economic class. However, it is unable to substantially pull the
female client out of poverty due to Honduras’ entrenched socioeconomic hierarchy. With
FINCA’s help, important improvements were seen in the food security and health of
clients’ families, but indicators measuring the money that a client lives on per day
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revealed a harsher reality—that women as clients of FINCA Honduras cannot
substantially change their financial situations through microloans. Microfinance has
allowed these women to subsist comfortably and even to improve the well-being of their
families, but a Honduran woman’s socioeconomic status is not likely to change with the
efforts of one non-profit organization. The significant reduction of poverty in Honduras
would require widespread structural reforms that the non-profit sector does not possess
the influence or the tools to accomplish.
Although FINCA Honduras does not have the capacity to significantly improve
the economic well-being of its female clients, it could enhance its economic
empowerment impact through the implementation of a more effective “credit-plus”
model of microfinance and through the provision of individual loans. FINCA Honduras
currently provides its clients with obligatory savings accounts and micro health
insurance, which require the client to pay monthly deposits and payments. FINCA clients
expressed repeated frustration with the fact that these extra services depleted their savings
but were not tailored to their specific needs. For example, FINCA’s health insurance only
covers hospital visits, which is problematic because many rural clients have no nearby
access to a hospital. It would be more beneficial for clients, perhaps, if these aspects of
FINCA’s credit-plus microfinance model were made voluntary in order to grant the client
more financial independence. As well, individual loans should be made more easily
available to clients—a frustration expressed by interviewees was the inability to manage
one’s finances without the burden of group responsibilities. The improved flexibility of
FINCA Honduras’ credit-plus services and the increased availability of individual loans
could improve this organization’s economic empowerment of its female clients—it could
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provide them with greater financial independence from the organization and thus the
ability to better manage their own profits and savings.
My investigation of the psychological empowerment of female FINCA Honduras
clients suggests that the organization has been successful in this regard, and supports a
correlation between increased economic independence and agency and increased selfconfidence for Honduran women. The FCAT survey findings suggest that FINCA
Honduras need not be concerned with measures to empower its female clients
psychologically, because increased self-confidence is a natural byproduct or outcome of
an individual’s increased ability to manage her finances and improve her success in
business. By measure of this survey with female FINCA clients, FINCA Honduras has
played an instrumental role in the psychological empowerment of Honduran women.
Finally, my examination of the socio-cultural empowerment of FINCA’s female
clients yields no significant results and suggests that socio-cultural changes in the lives of
Honduran women are far too difficult for this microfinance organization to generate on
its own. The impact of machismo and strong normative gender divisions in the home
within Honduran culture have become clear through the testimonies of these female
clients. The socio-cultural empowerment of women in any society is an extremely
complex process, as it requires the undermining of tightly knit social structures that have
been in place for centuries and, most importantly, that have been internalized by men and
women alike. Cultural norms such as these Honduran familial gender roles are deep-set
social phenomena that one microfinance organization cannot hope to overturn.
FINCA Honduras may be able to moderately increase familial gender equality for
women through specific socio-cultural empowerment programs, as part of its credit-plus
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model. Some microfinance organizations worldwide have aimed to tackle gender
inequalities with client education programs, as outlined in Chapter 2. Through the
implementation of programs such as educational workshops on reproductive rights or
gender equality, FINCA could possibly trigger positive socio-cultural changes for its
female clients, by granting them the knowledge and the tools to seek equality in the home
and the community. Some microfinance institutions have proven successful in their
attempts to socio-culturally empower their clients by these educational means. If FINCA
Honduras chose to address the socio-cultural empowerment of Honduran women, it could
enhance its credit-plus services with educational programs to promote gender equality.
This thesis has added one modest investigation to the large pool of worldwide
research on women’s empowerment through microfinance. My survey with 151 female
clients of FINCA Honduras falls in line with previous studies that present doubtful,
ambiguous, or negative results on microfinance’s ability to empower women. As I have
discussed, FINCA Honduras’ inability to economically and socio-culturally empower its
female clients can be attributed to the deep-set socioeconomic hierarchies and cultural
gender norms that prevail in Honduras. In contrast, the psychological empowerment that
these women have successfully achieved is most likely a natural byproduct of their
increased financial independence and agency with FINCA. FINCA Honduras fails to
fully empower the female client through its small financial services, and stands as a
testament to the weakness of non-profit organizations against national structural
inequalities. The true alleviation of poverty in developing nations requires vast structural
readjustments that could only be accomplished by government programs or powerful
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international organizations such as the IMF or the World Bank—not by the modest nonprofit sector.
Unfortunately, third world governments and international organizations have
made inadequate efforts to address structural socioeconomic inequalities, and have
instead endorsed microfinance as a panacea for global poverty. The world has responded
to this endorsement and celebrated the idea of microfinance because it provides a solution
that is too simple to be true: through one small loan, a poor individual can allegedly
transform her impoverished life into one of financial success and agency, and step by step
world poverty will be reversed. But we must not be so easily fooled, lest we allow
poverty and structural inequality to fester and spread underneath the band-aid of
microfinance’s rhetoric. Microfinance has generated important financial opportunities for
poor entrepreneurs worldwide, but its promises may not be enough to combat the global
wealth gap that continues to expand in this era of globalization. We must question the
popular narrative of microfinance and empowerment, and continue to seek more complex
programs and policies that will effectively address poverty across the globe.
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